Utilization of timed automata as a verification tool for real-time security protocols by Külahçıoğlu, Burcu
 
 
 
 
 
UTILIZATION OF TIMED AUTOMATA AS A 
VERIFICATION TOOL FOR REAL-TIME 
SECURITY PROTOCOLS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis Submitted to 
the Graduate School of Engineering and Sciences of 
İzmir Institute of Technology 
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of 
 
MASTER OF SCIENCE 
 
in Computer Engineering 
 
 
 
 
by 
Burcu KÜLAHÇIOĞLU 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
July 2010 
İZMİR 
 
 
 
 
We approve the thesis of Burcu KÜLAHÇIOĞLU 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
Prof. Dr. Sıtkı AYTAÇ 
Supervisor  
 
 
_______________________________ 
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ahmet KOLTUKSUZ 
Co-Supervisor  
 
 
_______________________________ 
Assist. Prof. Dr. Ufuk ÇELİKKAN 
Committee Member  
 
 
_______________________________ 
Assist. Prof. Dr. Gökhan DALKILIÇ 
Committee Member  
 
 
_______________________________ 
Assist. Prof. Dr. Serap ATAY 
Committee Member  
 
 
 
 
08 July 2010 
 
 
 
   _____________________________                    _____________________________ 
   Prof. Dr. Sıtkı AYTAÇ                         Assoc. Prof. Dr. Talat YALÇIN 
   Head of the Department                                           Dean of the Graduate School of         
   of Computer Engineering                                               Engineering and Sciences         
 
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
Foremost, I would like to gratefully acknowledge the supervision of my 
co-advisor, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ahmet Koltuksuz, for his patience, motivation, 
enthusiasm and valuable guidance throughout my research.  
I would like to thank to Prof. Dr. Sıtkı Aytaç for his support and 
encouragement. My sincere thanks go to Asst. Prof. Dr. Serap Atay for her 
advices through my study. 
I would also like to express my sincere appreciation to Selma Tekir for her 
patience and advices. She was always there to discuss my studies and motivate me 
during my research.  
I would like to thank Mutlu Beyazıt for his motivation and jokes that made 
the study more enjoyable. My room mate Gürcan Gerçek also deserves my thanks. 
I would like to give my special thanks to my family for supporting me not 
only throughout my education but my whole life. I would also like to express my 
deepest gratitude for my colleague and fiancé Murat Özkan for his academic 
support and encouragement. 
Finally, I would like to thank to The Scientific and Technological Research 
Council of Turkey (TUBITAK-BĠDEB) for supporting me during my master of 
science degree education.  
        
iv 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
UTILIZATION OF TIMED AUTOMATA AS A VERIFICATION TOOL 
FOR REAL-TIME SECURITY PROTOCOLS 
 
Timed Automata is an extension to the automata-theoretic approach to the 
modeling of real time systems that introduces time into the classical automata. Since it 
has been first proposed by Alur and Dill in the early nineties, it has become an 
important research area and been widely studied in both the context of formal languages 
and modeling and verification of real time systems. Timed automata use dense time 
modeling, allowing efficient model checking of time-sensitive systems whose correct 
functioning depend on the timing properties. One of these application areas is the 
verification of security protocols.  
This thesis aims to study the timed automata model and utilize it as a 
verification tool for security protocols. As a case study, the Neuman-Stubblebine 
Repeated Authentication Protocol is modeled and verified employing the time-sensitive 
properties in the model. The flaws of the protocol are analyzed and it is commented on 
the benefits and challenges of the model. 
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ÖZET 
 
ZAMANLI ÖZDEVĠNĠM KURAMININ GERÇEK ZAMANLI 
GÜVENLĠK PROTOKOLLERĠNĠN DOĞRULANMASINDA 
KULLANIMI 
 
Zamanlı özdevinim kuramı, klasik özdevinirler (otomata) kavramına zaman 
değişkenini ekleyerek bu modeli genişleten bir kuramdır. Doksanlı yılların başlarında 
öne sürülen zamanlı özdevinim kuramı, hem biçimsel diller hem de gerçek zamanlı 
sistem modelleme ve doğrulama alanlarında geniş ölçüde çalışılmaktadır. Zamanı 
sürekli bir değişken olarak ele alan zamanlı özdevinirler, doğru çalışması zaman 
kısıtlarına bağlı olan zaman kritik sistemler üzerinde model denetimine olanak 
sağlamaktadır. Bu uygulama alanlarından biri de güvenlik protokollerinin 
doğrulanmasıdır.  
Bu tezde, zamanlı özdevinim kuramının incelenmesi ve güvenlik protokollerinin 
doğrulanmasında kullanımı amaçlanmaktadır. Bir durum çalışması olarak, Neuman-
Stubblebine Tekrarlı Kimlik Denetimi Protokolü’nün, zamana bağlı özellikleri de dahil 
edilerek modellenmesi ve doğrulanması sunulmaktadır. Protokolün doğrulama sonuçları 
incelenerek modelin artı ve eksileri üzerinde yorumlara da yer verilmektedir. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Real time systems are designed to perform a certain task within certain 
timeliness requirements, such as real time controllers, multimedia applications and 
communication protocols. However for some cases, some real time systems may not 
behave as intended which constitutes an important problem. Thus, it is needed to verify 
the correctness of the system using some systematic methods.  
Formal verification methods can be used to model and analyze the behavior of a 
real time system to verify whether it meets the specified requirements. Formal 
verification can be performed using Theorem Proving methods that solve the general 
validity of a formula by using logical inference, or Model Checking methods that 
analyze a finite model of a system whether it fulfills the desired property. 
 In the literature, most verification methods (Pnueli 1977, Hoare 1978, Vardi and 
Wolper 1986) use the qualitative notion of time involving the partial ordering of the 
occurrence of events. However, the correctness of a real time system also depends on its 
quantitative timed properties. For example, for a communication protocol, it is more 
expressive to specify that ―the response should be received in 5 time units after it has 
sent the message‖ than ―the response should be received after it has sent the message‖.  
Since there is a need for the time-sensitive models in formal modeling and 
verification, some untimed formalisms are extended with timing information to obtain a 
model closer to the real world (Reed and Roscoe 1988, Alur and Henzinger 1989, Alur 
and Dill 1994, Cerone and Maggiolio-Schettini 1999). Among these, timed automata 
formalism is the most commonly used model, having mature and efficient automatic 
verification tools and an easily understandable syntax and semantics.  
Timed automata theory is proposed as an extension to the automata theoretic 
approach for the modeling of real time systems (Alur and Dill 1994). It is a class of 
automata extended with clock variables which model dense time. Timed automata 
theory has become an important research area and been widely studied in the context of 
both the theory of formal languages and verification of real time systems.  
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The theory of timed automata allows us to create models of real time systems 
which can be verified using model checking methods. There are some timed automata 
tools designed for this aim which have been used for several industrial and academic 
case studies. UPPAAL (Bengtsson and Larsen 1996), which is used in this thesis and 
KRONOS (Yovine 1997) are the most popular automatic verification tools among 
these. Similar to the other model checking methods, model checking with timed 
automata involves building a finite state model of a system and verifying a specified 
property by traversing through all reachable states. The method has the advantages of 
being fully automatic, generating a counter example in case of a negative result; 
nevertheless, it suffers from the state space explosion problem.  
Timed automata model checking is used for the verification of many real time 
systems such as power controllers, gear controllers and audio-video protocols. One of 
the most important application areas of timed automata is the verification of the security 
protocols which aim secure communications over a network and used to provide a goal 
such as the authentication or distribution of cryptographic keys. As the use of computers 
and the internet is considerably increasing, the correctness of the security protocols is 
getting more important. However, most of the security protocols are found to be flawed 
which brings the network into an insecure state.  
For a security protocol, the quantitative timing properties are critical and an 
intruder can attack the protocol by exploiting the timing and the flow of the messages. 
Hence, the timing properties should be employed into the security protocol model. 
Some recent studies concentrate on the analysis of the security protocols with timing 
information on the case studies of Needham-Schroeder and Yahalom authentication 
protocols (Corin, et al. 2004, 2007). The studies in (Jakubowska, et al. 2005, 2008) 
examine Kerberos, TMN, Neuman-Stubblebine and Andrew Secure RPC protocols by 
not modeling them directly as timed automata, but translating a language specification 
of a security protocol automatically to timed automata without integer variables.  
This study utilizes timed automata as a verification tool for security protocols 
including timing information. Our case study, models Neuman-Stubblebine repeated 
authentication protocol directly with timed automata; then, verifies its security 
properties using UPPAAL timed automata tool based on the goals of an authentication 
protocol. Studying on a repeated authentication protocol gives the opportunity to 
include the key expiration time in the model, in addition to the time needed for 
cryptographic operations and timeout intervals.  
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First, the theory of timed automata is introduced. Besides the basic definitions 
and the decidability properties of the model which are fundamental for verification, 
some variants of timed automata proposed in some studies are mentioned briefly, that 
provides a better theoretical understanding and reasoning on the model.  
As it will be explained in the theory of timed automata, the theoretical timed 
automata structures are hard to implement. Hence, the next chapter is devoted to the 
symbolic data structures and algorithms for timed automata implementation. This 
chapter provides an insight about the implementation of timed automata tools and how 
they perform automatic verification algorithmically. 
Later, model checking with timed automata is explained and the UPPAAL tool 
is introduced since the modeling and verification with this tool is used in next chapters.  
Next, the case study on Neuman-Stubblebine repeated authentication protocol is 
presented. It is a repeated protocol that consists of an initial and a subsequent 
authentication parts. Since the complete model of the protocol is so large that some 
problems arise in verification step, the initial and the subsequent authentication parts are 
analyzed individually. In this chapter, first, the modeling assumptions are given and it is 
explained how to model and abstract away the cryptographic details. Then, the 
construction of the automata models for the initial and subsequent parts are explained in 
detail. The verification of these parts are provided based on goals of an authentication 
protocol and the attacks on the protocol we can or cannot detect are explained. Later, 
these parts are merged to obtain a complete model for the protocol. 
Later, an analysis of the case study is provided including the benefits and the 
challenges of the model and some possible extensions that can be proposed. The most 
serious problem, state space explosion problem, is defined and restrictions and the 
limitations applied to avoid it in the case study are explained exhaustively.  
Finally, the study is concluded with the comments on the model and the further 
perspectives for the analysis of the security protocols using timed automata. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
TIMED AUTOMATA THEORY 
 
2.1. Modeling Time 
Although many fields of science and engineering involve time concept, in 
computer science, time is totally not considered or abstracted by modeling only the 
required features of it. However, some kind of time modeling is necessary in many 
areas of computing such as in hardware design, parallel processing and complexity 
calculations (Furia, et al. 2010). In this study, the focus is the representation of time for 
the modeling, specification and verification of real time systems whose correct 
functioning depends on their timed properties. 
In the literature, most of the modeling and verification methods (Pnueli 1977, 
Hoare 1978, Vardi and Wolper 1986) involve qualitative notion of time rather than the 
quantitative notion. Qualitative notion only includes the relative ordering between 
events that specifies which event comes after the other. However, quantitative notion 
describes a distance between the events which is required for the verification of real 
time systems. For example, for a communication protocol, it is more expressive to 
specify that ―the event   should occur in   time units after the occurrence of the event 
 ‖ rather then ―the event   should occur after the occurrence of the event  ‖. 
To meet the need for formalisms with quantitative timing information, some 
untimed formalisms are extended with quantitative notion. These formalisms are: the 
extensions of the linear time logics (LTL) (Pnueli 1977) and the computational tree 
logic (CTL) (Emerson and Clarke 1982), namely metric temporal logic (MTL) (Alur 
and Henzinger 1990), timed temporal logic (TPTL) (Alur and Henzinger 1989), real-
time temporal logic (RTTL) (Ostroff 1989), explicit-clock temporal logic (XCTL) 
(Harel 1990), real-time computation tree logic (RTCTL) (Emerson, et al. 1990) and 
timed computation tree logic (TCTL) (Alur, et al. 1993a); timed process algebras such 
as timed Communicating Sequential Processes (TCSP) (Reed and Roscoe 1988); timed 
Petri Nets (Cerone and Maggiolio-Schettini 1999) which is more appropriate for work-
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flow processes (Srba 2008) and timed automata (Alur and Dill 1994) which is an 
extension to the automata-theoretic approach. 
 For a real time system modeling technique, the representation of time is an 
important design issue. Different approaches for the representation of time may be more 
appropriate for different kinds of systems or modeling objectives (Alur and Henzinger 
1992, Furia, et al. 2010). 
 Many formalisms assume that the states of a system are observed only at integral 
times; although, in a real-time system, events may occur at any point. This 
approach uses discrete time modeling, which maps onto the integer numbers 
domain. Clocks tick at regular intervals and events can occur at each clock tick, 
at the multiples of ε. Here, it is important how to define the interval between two 
clock ticks,  . If   is defined to be too large, then the model is too coarse; on the 
other hand, if ε is defined to be too small, then the state space will be too large.  
 Fictitious clock approach, introduces a special tick event into the model. Time is 
modeled as a global state variable on the domain of the natural numbers and it is 
divided into several ticks. The time delay between two events is measured by 
counting the number of these ticks. Hence, the exact time delay between two 
events cannot be measured.  
 In continuous time modeling, time is modeled with non-negative real numbers. 
Hence, events can occur at any time and delays may be arbitrarily small. Dense 
time is strictly more expressive than discrete time. However, it gives rise to an 
uncountable state space. Timed automata uses continuous time modeling which 
is more faithful to the nature of real-time systems. 
 In timed automata, the passage of time is modeled by the real-valued clock 
variables, which record the elapsed time. All clocks are synchronized. They run at the 
same speed, having the same derivative with respect to time, which is assumed to be 
equal to  . The absolute time is implicitly assumed by the model and the relative timing 
can be measured explicitly by testing the clock variables (Furia, et al. 2010). 
 The clocks can be tested and set to a value at the transitions. Note that we 
concentrate on the classical timed automata, in which only reset (setting to value  ) of a 
clock is allowed. Also, in timed automata, a transition from one state to another is 
assumed to be instantaneous; in other words, time passes only in states, not in edges.  
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 In timed automata, it is possible to have a zeno run which allows infinite number 
of events occurring in a finite amount of time. The zeno-timelocks, where time cannot 
pass beyond a certain point, also constitute zeno behavior resulting in the performance 
of an infinite number of actions in a finite period of time. (Penczek and Polrola 2006, 
Bowman and Gomez 2006) 
2.2. Timed Automata 
The class of timed automata is a special subclass of hybrid automata (Alur, et al. 
1993b) that include both discrete and continuous variables. Same as the classical 
automata, timed automata have finite number of states (locations) and edges. In 
addition, it has some number of real-valued clock variables which model the passage of 
time. 
 Alur and Dill who first proposed the timed automata theory (Alur and Dill 
1994), defined some restrictions on the clock variables. In this model, the clocks can be 
reset only when an edge is taken and only clocks reset to the value   is allowed.  
Definition (Clock Constraint): Let   be a set of clock variables. Then set      of 
clock constraints is given by the following grammar: 
                                    where          
 Clock constraints can be guards on edges that control whether it is allowed to 
take the transition in the current time. The guards can also be associated with locations 
and are called location invariants. The automata allowing the use of location invariants, 
introduces a more intuitive notion of progress. These automata can be called as timed 
safety automata but generally referred as timed automata. 
 In the timed automaton given in Figure 2.1, the clock constraints    ,      
and     are the guards on edge. To take the edge from    to   , event   must occur 
and the clock variable   must have a value greater than  . If this transition is enabled, 
the clock variable   is set to  .     is an invariant and forces to take the edge from    
to   when the clock variable   has a value smaller than  . Note that using this invariant 
does not have the same effect as having the guard         on the transition. 
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Figure 2.1. A Timed Automaton 
 
Definition (Clock valuation): Clock valuation is a function       , that assigns 
every clock to a real variable. Let   be a clock valuation. Then,  
 Initially,          for all  . 
 Clock reset:  
                
           
  
 Clock increment:                                                     
The interpretation      means that the valuation   satifies the constraint  . 
Definition (Timed Automaton): A timed automaton is a tuple                 where 
   is a finite event alphabet 
   is a finite set of states 
      is a set of start states 
      is a set of final (accepting) states 
   is a finite set of clocks 
                              are the edges where 
                                  with          
 A transition can be written as   
     
       whenever               , where   is 
a guard,   an event and   a subset of clocks to be reset. 
The following subclasses of automata are defined depending on the strictness on 
the inequalities of the clock constraints:  
 Open timed automata can only have the clock constraints given as       
                 . They are ―acceptance robust‖; when they accept a 
time trace, they accept also the neighbor timed traces. 
 Closed timed automata can only have the clock constraints given as        
                 . They are ―rejection robust‖; where rejected traces are 
robust under small perturbations.  
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 A run of timed automaton   has the following form:         
  
          
 
         
     
              
  
    
    
           , where each pair       is a timed event 
with    , which is the timestamp of the event    .  A run is accepted if      .  
Definition (Timed word): A timed word or a timed trace is a finite sequence of timed 
events with non-decreasing timestamps having the form                            
with         where      and     .  
 Timed words can be obtained from the runs of the timed automata where 
accepting timed words make up the language     . An example timed word is given 
below, for the automaton in Figure 2.1. 
                                  
      
        
    
       
    
       
    
       
      
        
    
       
x:    0           3.8         0         2         2          5.2        0 
y:    0       3.8        3.8     5.8       5.8          9          0  
Timed word (timed trace):                        
 In a run,      with     is called an action transition and     with     is a 
delay transition. If   in      is equal to  , then two consecutive transitions can be 
executed without time passing in between. Such runs are called weakly monotonic. But, 
it is sometimes more convenient to restrict the runs to contain non-zero passing times 
only, which are called strongly monotonic. Simply, weakly monotonic time traces 
(    ) allow several events may share the same time stamp where strongly 
monotonic time traces (    ) allow no two events happen at the same time (Penczek 
and Polrola 2006).  
2.3. Timed Regular Languages 
 Inspiring from the theory of regular languages accepted by finite state automata, 
timed regular languages can also be defined for timed automata. A timed language   is 
a collection of timed words.   is timed regular if there is a timed automaton whose 
accepting timed traces (timed words) make up the timed language   (Alur, et al. 2004, 
Asarin, et al. 2002). 
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Definition (Timed Regular Language): A timed language   is a timed regular 
language iff          for some timed automaton  .  
Definition (Untiming): If                               , then           
         . 
Theorem: Given a timed automaton                   , there exists an automaton 
over   which accepts             . 
 This theorem leads to the fact that, if   is a timed regular language, then 
          is a regular language. An example not timed regular language can be given 
as a language of timed words where every   symbol is followed by some   symbol after 
a delay of  . A timed automaton cannot be generated for that language since there can 
be unbounded number of   symbols in a timed word that needs the use of infinite 
number of clocks. Another example for a not timed regular language is the untimed 
language                            since it is not even a regular language. 
 The next theorem gives the closure properties of timed regular languages for 
union and intersection operations. Similar to the untimed automata, the union timed 
automata can be constructed by taking the disjoint union of all the automata, and the 
intersection automata can be obtained by constructing the product of the automata. 
Theorem: A set of timed regular languages is closed under union and intersection. 
However, the class of timed automata is not closed under complementation, which 
is included in next section. 
2.4. Decidability and Complexity of Timed Automata 
 A certain property is decidable for a formal language if there is a procedure that 
can determine whether the property holds in the model. The amount of memory and the 
time required for the algorithm that solves this decidability problem gives the 
complexity of the problem.  
 For timed automata, the emptiness, universality and language inclusion 
problems are the most studied decision problems since they are also the fundamental 
problems for verification. The solution of the language inclusion problem requires the 
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complementability (therefore, determinizability) of timed automata, which also 
constitute important decision problems. 
2.4.1. Emptiness Problem 
The emptiness problem asks whether the language generated by a formal model 
is empty. The following is the definition of the emptiness problem for timed automata.  
Definition (Emptiness Problem): It is the problem of ―given a timed automaton  , is 
the set of timed traces of   empty?‖. 
 In a verification task, given an implementation and a specification, the 
reachability problem is used to test whether a state which satisfies the specification is 
reachable. The emptiness problem is fundamental for verification tasks since it is 
reducible to the reachability problem that tests whether a state can be reached in a 
model.  
However, the solution of this problem is more cumbersome than untimed 
automata. Since the configurations of timed automata are infinite, even a very simple 
automaton generates infinitely many reachable states. Figure 2.2 gives a simple timed 
automaton giving rise to an infinite transition system where naive explicit state search is 
not reasonable. The idea is constructing a model on which finite state analysis is 
possible so that we can examine the decidability of the reachability problem.  
                
 
Figure 2.2. Illustration of an Infinite State System 
                      
 The decidability of the emptiness problem for timed automata is proved by 
constructing a transition table that mimics the runs of  . To achieve this goal, state 
space is partitioned into finitely many equivalence classes so that equivalent states 
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exhibit similar behaviors. Infinite number of clock valuations are partitioned into 
finitely many clock regions, whose definition is given below. 
Definition (Clock Regions): Let       be fixed. Define an equivalence relation   
on      .    partitions into finitely many equivalence classes called regions (Alur, et 
al. 1990, Alur and Dill 1994). 
Let for any     ,          denote the fractional part of   and     denote the 
integral part of  ; that is                . The equivalence relation   is defined 
over the set of all clock interpretations for  . 
                        if 
 for all        
 either             
 or both    and     are greater than   (exceeds    ) 
 for all         with    ,       
                                            
 for all        with      
                            
 Figure 2.3 shows the clock regions of a timed automaton with two clock 
variables   and  , having ― ‖ as the maximum clock constant in the clock constraints 
for   and ― ‖ for  . 
 
Figure 2.3. Clock Regions of a Timed Automaton 
                 
                       
               
       ,        ,        ,        ,        ,         
         ,            ,           ,  
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         ,          ,            , 
         ,             ,          ,               
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 A region automaton      can be constructed that is equivalent to the semantics 
of a timed automaton   with respect to reachability. This region automaton      
records the state of  , and the equivalence class of the current values of the clocks. 
Before formally defining a region automaton, let us define the time successor of a 
region which is simply the region that can be reached by the passage of time. 
Definition (Time Successor): A clock region    is a time successor of a clock region   
iff for each    , there exists a positive     such that         (Alur and Dill 
1994). 
                                            
 
Figure 2.4. Time Successors of a Clock Region 
 
 Figure 2.4 shows the time successors of the clock region               
        , which are, other than itself,                      ,      
                                ,                  . This means, when 
the clock valuation is in that region, the passage of time can bring us to the one of these 
time successors. Time successors of a region can be easily found by drawing a line 
parallel to     line, starting from this region to the upwards.  
Definition (Region Automata): For                   , a region automaton      is 
a transition table over the alphabet  : 
 the states:       
 the initial states:           
 R(A) has an edge                   iff there is an edge                  and a 
region    ; such that  
(i)     is a time successor of  ,  
(ii)     satisfies,  
(iii)            . 
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 Figure 2.5 gives the region automaton for the given timed automaton. The initial 
state of the region automaton is the state    where both the clocks are equal to  . The 
transition from    to    can be taken when   is greater than  . Notice that, the greatest 
constant in the time constraints is  . Hence, this constant will be considered while 
generating the regions. In order for the clock   to get greater than  , some time should 
elapse in state   . So, the event   can taken when      ,     or    . Since the 
clock   is reset at the transition, we can reach to the state    having the clock regions 
       ,     and    ,     and    . The rest of the region automaton is 
constructed in a similar way by considering the time successors and transitions for the 
states in region automata. 
 
 
Figure 2.5. Region Automaton of a Timed Automaton 
 
 The region automaton of a timed automaton   can recognize the language 
            . Hence, the emptiness problem of a timed automaton may be examined 
by checking the emptiness of its region automata. In order to calculate the complexity of 
this problem, we should calculate the number of clock regions in a region automaton.  
 Let    be the largest constant in the clock constraints of the clock     where   
is the set of all clocks. For each region, there is one clock constraint from the set 
                                                  . The number of 
ways to choose this value for each clock is             . The ordering of the 
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fractional parts of the clocks may be chosen in       ways (For example, for   clocks we 
may have    permutations as      ,      ,      ,      ,      , 
     ). The fractional part of a clock may also be equal to the fractional part of its 
predecessor (such as      ), the number of ways to choose this is bounded by     
Lemma: Given a timed automaton  , the number of regions of      is bounded by 
                            .  
Theorem: Given a timed automaton  , the emptiness of      can be checked in time 
                                    . 
Theorem: The problem of deciding the emptiness of the language of a given timed 
automaton  , is                 (Alur, et al.1990, Alur and Dill 1994). 
 Since the number of regions is exponential in the number of clocks for the 
region automata, it suffers from a combinatorics explosion. Hence, this structure is not 
feasible to implement. Instead of this, symbolic data structures and algorithms are used 
for implementation of timed automata to perform reachability tests easier on them, as 
explained in Chapter 3. 
2.4.2. Universality Problem 
Definition (Universality problem): It is the problem that asks ―given a timed 
automaton  , does it accept all timed traces?‖. 
Universality problem for timed automata is undecidable, which is proved for the 
classical timed automata in general sense, by reducing the problem to the halting 
problem of two-counter machines (Alur and Dill 1994). Before giving the proof, let us 
define the two counter machines. Then we will examine, given a 2-counter 
nondeterministic machine, how to construct the corresponding timed automaton. 
Definition (Two-counter machine): A nondeterministic 2-counter machine   is a 
triple                       with a sequence of   instructions and two counters  ,  .  
 In a two-counter machine, each    (i) can increment or decrement one of the 
counters and jumps nondeterministically to one of the possible next instructions, or (ii) 
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tests one of the counters for emptiness and jumps unconditionally to the next 
instruction. A configuration of   is a triple          where                    ,   
 ,    . A halting computation of   is a finite sequence of configurations starting 
with          and ending with         . The problem of deciding whether a given 
nondeterministic 2-counter machine has a halting computation, is        . 
Theorem: Given a timed automaton  , universality problem for   is undecidable. 
Proof: The universality problem for timed automata is examined by reducing this 
problem to the halting problem of two-counter machines. The automaton is encoded on 
the alphabet                  , where                     is a halting computation 
of  , having           ,           . The strings       is in a timed language        
such that, in this string, the subsequence of  , corresponding time interval         
encodes the     configuration in a way that, for all    , 
 if         then for every    at time   in the interval          , there is an 
   at time     
 if           then for every    at time   in the interval           except the 
last one, there is an    at time     
 if           then for every   at time   in the interval         except the last 
one, there is an    at time     
 similar requirements hold for    
 Let us say that given a 2-counter machine  , the words corresponding to the 
halting computations of   make up the language       . The idea is to construct the 
automaton        (this is the disjunction of several automata each demonstrating an 
unacceptable behavior for a two counter machine. These are the automata (i)    that 
accepts       for some    , there is no   symbol at time  , or the subsequence of   in 
the interval         is not of the form   
   
  , the string having the substring     , (ii) 
      accepts       iff the substring of   corresponding [1, 2) is not   , meaning that 
       or      or     , (iii) for each      , we construct an automaton    
which checks whether the next instruction is valid with respect to current instruction), 
accepts the complement of       . Hence, if the two-counter machine does not halt, we 
say that        is empty, implying that the automaton is universal (Alur and Dill, 1994). 
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Special Cases: 
There are some studies on universality problem with some restrictions on the 
timed automata where some of them yield to the decidability of the problem. Generally, 
in the verification studies, no such restrictions are applied on the timed automata model. 
However, we briefly cover the theorems stating the decidability results for some cases 
to see a direction of research on timed automata and have a better insight of the model. 
Considering the time traces being weakly or strongly monotonic, the decidability 
of the universality problem is dependent upon the open and closed subclasses of timed 
automata. The theorems below, give the decidability results of open and closed timed 
automata over      and     . The proofs for these theorems use the digitization 
properties of timed automata and can be found in (Ouaknine and Worrell 2003b). 
Theorem:  
(i) The universality problem for open and closed timed automata over      is 
undecidable.  
(ii) The universality problem for open timed automata over     is decidable.  
(iii) The universality problem for closed timed automata over either      or 
     is undecidable.  
 Universality problem for timed automata is also studied by adding some 
restrictions on the resources of a timed automaton which are the number of states, size 
of event alphabet and clock constraints. The study in (Adams, et al. 2007) examines the 
problem with minimal resources. The following theorems give these decidability 
results. 
Theorem:  
(i) Over     , the universality problem is undecidable for timed automata 
with a single state, a single-event alphabet, and clock constants   and   only. 
(ii) Over     , the universality problem is undecidable for timed automata 
with a single state, a single-event alphabet, and clock constants  ,   and   
only. 
 The next theorems state that, for timed automata over finite words, the one-clock 
universality problem is decidable with non-primitive recursive complexity. However, if 
ε-transitions or non-singular post-conditions are allowed, then the one-clock 
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universality problem is undecidable over both finite and infinite words. The proofs for 
these theorems can be found in (Adams, et al. 2005, 2007). The universality for the 
timed automata with one clock and  -transitions is undecidable. 
(iii) The universality for the timed automata with one clock and with non- 
singular post-conditions is undecidable. 
(iv) The universality for the timed automata with a single clock is decidable and 
has non-primitive recursive complexity (the problem does not lie in the 
complexity class            for any primitive recursive function     ) 
over finite timed words.  
(v) The universality for one-clock nondeterministic timed automata is 
undecidable over infinite timed words (Lasota and Walukiewicz 2008). 
2.4.3. Language Inclusion Problem 
Definition (Language Inclusion Problem): Given two timed automata    and   , it is 
the problem of checking whether            . 
 Language inclusion problem is important for the verification of systems. In 
order to perform verification of a system, the behavior of the implementation and the 
requirements that the system should satisfy can each be represented as a set of traces. 
Then, it can be checked whether the implementation satisfies the specification, in other 
words, whether the set of specification traces includes the set of implementation traces. 
Given a specification    and an implementation   , the implementation meets its 
specification iff            .  
Corollary: The language inclusion problem for the timed automata is undecidable. 
 The undecidability of the problem can be easily seen by reducing the 
universality problem to the language inclusion problem. The automaton   is universal 
iff               . 
Special Cases: 
 Similar to the universality problem, some studies yield decidability of the 
language inclusion problem for special cases. 
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Theorem:  
(i) The language inclusion problem over      is only decidable when   is a 
closed timed and   is an open timed automata.  
(ii) The language inclusion problem over      is undecidable in all cases 
(Ouaknine and Worrell 2003). 
 The problem also becomes decidable with some restrictions. The proofs for the 
following theorems can be found in (Ouaknine and Worrell 2004). 
Theorem: The language inclusion problem asking whether           is decidable 
where  
(i) the timed automaton   has at most one clock. 
(ii) the timed automaton   has   as the only constant used in the clock 
constraints. 
 In addition to these results, this problem is proved to be decidable for some 
subclasses or variants of timed automata which are given in sections 2.5 and 2.6. 
2.4.4. Complementability, Determinizability and Minimization 
2.4.4.1. Complementability 
 Complementing an untimed deterministic finite state automaton is simple and 
the complement automaton can be easily obtained by just exchanging the accepting and 
non accepting states. However, this is not the case for a timed automaton. 
Theorem: The class of timed regular languages is not closed under complementation.  
Proof: Given two timed automaton   and  ,           iff the intersection of      
and the complement of      is empty. Assume that the set of timed automata is closed 
under complementation. Then,           iff there is an automaton   such that 
          is nonempty, but           is empty. This follows that the complement 
of the inclusion problem is recursively enumerable, contradicting the undecidability of 
the inclusion problem (Alur and Dill 1994). 
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The study in (Tripakis 2006) examines the problems asking whether a timed 
automaton is complementable, determinizable, or minimizable; which also ask for a 
solution automaton if the answer is ―yes‖. The proofs are based on the reduction of the 
problems to the universality problem. 
Theorem: The problem ―Given a timed automaton   does there exist a timed 
automaton such that                 ? If so, construct such B‖ is not Turing computable. In 
other words, there does not exist an effective procedure which given a timed automaton 
  it constructs   such that                  if it exists, or says ―no‖ if such a timed 
automaton does not exist.  
Proof: Given a timed automaton  , if its complement timed automaton   exists, then 
we can compute  .      will be universal iff       . If   does not exist, then      
is not universal, because the empty language can be accepted by a timed automaton with 
no accepting states. 
2.4.4.2. Determinizability 
Definition (Deterministic timed automata): A timed automaton   is deterministic iff 
(i) the set of initial locations is a singleton, (ii)      and     , if there are two 
edges                and               , then the guards    and    are mutually 
exclusive.  
If   is a deterministic timed automaton, then for every timed word       , 
there is a unique run over   accepting it. Figure 2.6 gives an example deterministic 
timed automaton. 
 
 
Figure 2.6. A Deterministic Timed Automaton 
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Theorem: There does not exist an effective procedure which given a timed automaton 
  outputs a deterministic timed automaton   such that           if   exists, or says 
―no‖ if such a timed automaton does not exist. 
 Let us assume that such a procedure exists. (i) If   exists, since it is 
deterministic, one can construct the automaton   which is           , by interchanging the 
accepting and non-accepting states. Now,      is universal iff       . (ii) If   does 
not exist, then      is not universal since the universal language can be accepted by a 
deterministic timed automaton with a single accepting state, no clocks, and a self loop 
for each letter in   (Tripakis 2006). 
Figure 2.7 gives an example of timed automaton that cannot be complemented 
or determinized. Since there is no bound on the number of  ’s that can occur in any 
time interval, any timed automaton capturing the complement of      would require an 
unbounded number of clocks to keep track of the times of all the  ’s within the past one 
time unit (Alur and Dill 1994). 
 
 
Figure 2.7. An Automaton that cannot be Determinized and Complemented 
 
2.4.4.3. Minimization 
Minimization problems for a timed automaton  , ask whether it is possible to 
create an equivalent timed automaton   with a reduced number of clocks or lessened 
magnitude of clock constraints. 
Theorem: There does not exist an effective procedure which given a timed automaton 
  with   clocks (where    ), outputs a timed automaton B with     clocks such 
that            if it exists, or says ―no‖ if such a timed automaton does not exist. 
21 
 
Proof: The universality problem can be reduced to the minimization problem. Given  , 
if such an automaton   exists, construct a timed automaton having     clocks. If   
exists with zero clocks, check whether the untimed language of   is equal to   . Since it 
has no clock, it has no constraints on them. If        
 , then            . If 
such   does not exist,   is not universal since universal automaton can be reduced to an 
automaton with no clocks. 
Theorem: There does not exist an efficient procedure which given a timed automaton   
with   as the maximum constant in clock constraints, and outputs a timed automaton   
with     as the maximum constant in clock constraints such that            if it 
exists, or says ―no‖ is such a timed automaton does not exist.  
Proof: If exists such an automaton, size of the constraint can be reduced until it is zero 
or to a constant that cannot be reduced any more. To construct   having constants at 
most zero can be reduced to the problem in previous theorem (Finkel 2006). 
If it was possible to minimize a timed automaton into a reduced model, than we 
could be able to perform verification easier which would further improve the efficiency 
of the timed automata model.  
2.5. Variants of Timed Automata  
In the previous sections, the classical definition of timed automata is given. Then, 
its closure and decidability results are explained. It can be seen that, although it is a 
powerful tool for real time verification, it has some drawbacks in the formal language 
concepts. It is not closed under complementation and determinizability is undecidable. 
Clock reduction is possible for some timed automata but the possibility is also 
undecidable. For the verification aspects, the emptiness problem is decidable but 
universality problem is not decidable in general.  
In the literature, some variants of timed automata are proposed and studied 
whether they yield better decidability results or make up a determinizable class of timed 
automata. They are some modified or restricted classes of the classical timed automata, 
some of which lead to the decidability of some problems. 
Before going on these variants of the model, it is important to note that the timed 
automata tools implement and case studies use the classical timed automata model. 
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Although these proposed variants are not implemented, we give brief explanation of 
them to provide a better understanding of the timed automata model.  
2.5.1.  -transitions on Timed Automata 
A silent action   is a non observable event and the transition labeled with that 
action is called a silent transition. Timed automata with  -transitions, shown as    , are 
strictly more expressive than the timed automata without  -transitions,   . Figure 2.8 
gives an example     that accepts the timed words with even timestamps, that cannot 
be expressed with a timed automaton (Bérard, et al. 1998) (Note that UPPAAL tool that 
is used for drawing this figure, in fact does not accept the events   (the event alphabet) 
and  .). 
Theorem: Given a    , it is undecidable to determine whether there exists a      such 
that          . 
For a    , the complementability, determinizability and computability of the 
minimal number of clocks needed to recognize its  -timed regular language are also 
undecidable (Bouyer, et al. 2009). 
 
 
Figure 2.8. A     that cannot be Expressed with a    
 
2.5.2. Diagonal Constraints and Updates on Timed Automata 
In classical timed automata, only reset to   is allowed as clock update. The 
studies in (Bouyer, et al. 2000, 2004) concentrate on updatable timed automata which 
allows for different kinds of updates that may allow simpler and more concise 
representations of some real-time systems. They examine the decidability results of 
these models by considering the diagonal properties of timed automata.  
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 A timed automaton is diagonal-free if its clock constraints are defined by: 
                  where         and                 . Diagonal 
automata can also contain any sub formula of the form         where   and   are 
clocks, and          . Note that the diagonal-free automata have the same 
expressive power as the automata with diagonal constraints, since there exists a 
diagonal free timed automaton equivalent to a diagonal automaton (Alur and Dill 1994, 
Bérard, et al. 1998). 
The summary of the decidability results for updatable timed automata are given 
in Table 2.1. The decidable classes are not more powerful than classical automata, and 
even bisimilar automata for them can be constructed.  
 
Table 2.1. Decidability of Diagonal-free and Diagonal Automata with Updates 
Updates Diagonal-free Constraints Diagonal Constraints 
        
PSPACE-Complete 
PSPACE-Complete 
      
Undecidable       
      Undecidable 
    
PSPACE-Complete 
PSPACE-Complete 
    
Undecidable 
      
          
          Undecidable 
 
2.5.3. Robust Timed Automata 
The idea for robust timed automata comes from the real-time systems that 
cannot realize the exact time   but can have a physical error   which are insensitive to 
small errors. Robust timed automata accept tubes rather than trajectories where a tube is 
defined as an open set of trajectories that consists of a bundle of sufficiently similar 
trajectories. If a tube includes a trajectory, then it also includes its neighbors; hence the 
system accepts trajectories of time           (Gupta, et al. 1997, Henzinger and 
Jean-Francois 2000). 
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Similar to the classical automata, the emptiness problem of robust timed 
automata is        complete and the robust universality problem is undecidable. 
2.5.4. Event Clock Automata 
Event clock automata (   ) is a determinizable subclass of timed automata. In 
an    , the clocks can record the time elapsed after an event’s last occurrence, or the 
clocks can be used to predict the time of the next occurrence of an event. The first 
subclass of the event clock automata is called event-recording automata (   ) where 
the latter one is called event-predicting automata (   ) (Alur, et al. 1999). 
Although nondeterministic automata are more expressive than its deterministic 
counterpart, nondeterministic event clock automata and the deterministic one are 
equally expressive. For every event-clock automaton  , there is a deterministic event-
clock automaton that is equivalent to  . 
The event clock automata have a decidable language inclusion problem, it is 
                to check whether           for two event-clock automata. 
2.5.5. Alternating Timed Automata 
Alternating timed automata       is obtained by introducing universal 
transitions in the same way as it is done for Alternating Finite Automaton (AFA). It is 
known that the class of timed automata is not closed under complementation. Instead of 
restricting the model to deterministic timed automata or event-clock automata by 
restricting reset operations, alternating timed automata provides a model that is closed 
under Boolean operations.  
    is defined by the tuple                    with             
             is a finite partial function and for every   and  , the set 
                            gives a finite partition of     
 . 
Note that the class of languages recognized by one-clock alternating timed 
automaton is incomparable with the class of languages recognized by timed automata. 
The emptiness problem is decidable for one-clock    . However, the emptiness over 
infinite words for one-clock     is undecidable (Lasota and Walukiewicz 2008).  
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2.5.6. Integer Reset Timed Automata 
Integer Reset Timed Automata (    ) are a syntactic subclass of timed 
automata where clock resets are restricted to occur at integer valued time points. This 
subclass of timed automata is shown to be useful since they used for verification of 
some real time systems as given in (Suman, et al. 2008).  
      can be determinized to  -clock deterministic      which is 
complementable. It also yields to a decidable language inclusion problem such that if   
is a timed automaton and   is an     , than           is decidable. 
The study in (Suman and Pandya 2009) examines      with silent transitions, 
       which is closed under complementation. However, it is undecidable to 
determine whether for a given timed automaton there exists an ε      equivalent to 
it. 
2.6. Digitization of Timed Automata 
We know that timed automata uses continuous time modeling which is more 
faithful to the nature of real-time systems. Although timed automata tools, most case 
studies and our study involve dense time, this section gives brief information on the 
digitization concepts since they are important in terms of leading the decidability of 
language inclusion problem.  
Digitization techniques reduce the dense-time model to discrete time. Although 
dense time is more expressive, digitization makes the model checking easier. The 
―digitization‖ concepts are introduced and defined by Henzinger et al. (Henzinger, et al. 
1992b, Bosnacki 1999). 
Definition (Digitization): Given     and        , let          if        , 
otherwise         . For any precisely timed sequence         and        , let 
the  -digitization                             . For example, let us have a precisely 
timed trace                           . Then, this trace will have    -
digitization                          .  
Digitized timed automata only consider integral values for the clocks. Figure 2.9 
shows the time regions constructed for a digitized automaton. 
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Figure 2.9. Time Regions for a Digitized Timed Automaton 
 
Definition (Digitizability): A dense time property is digitizable iff it is closed both 
under digitization and under inverse digitization. A set of timed traces   is closed under 
digitization if for any      ,       .   is closed under inverse digitization if 
whenever a timed trace      such that        for all      , then    . 
Theorem: Let the set of timed traces   be closed under digitization,    be closed under 
inverse digitization and    be the set of all integral timed traces of   (those timed traces 
of   whose events are integral time stamps). Then,      if and only if        
(Ouaknine and Worrell 2003a). 
 This theorem yields a decidable language inclusion problem and underlines the 
importance of being able to determine the digitization properties of timed automata. The 
problem of closure under digitization is decidable for both open and closed timed 
automata; however, the problem of closure under inverse digitization is undecidable for 
closed timed automata.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
IMPLEMENTATION OF TIMED AUTOMATA 
 
 As explained in the previous chapter, the class of timed automata is proved to be 
decidable for real time system verification by using region-based technique. However, 
this technique is hard to implement since it gives rise to an explosion in the number of 
regions depending on not only the number of components in a system but also the 
largest time constant and the number of clocks used to specify timing constraints. 
Hence, instead of implementing these structures, symbolic representation of states and 
on-the-fly model checking are preferred resulting in space and time savings.  
 On-the-fly model checking means dynamically building the state space during 
the model checking process, depending on the property to be model checked (Bozga, et 
al. 1998, Larsen, et al. 1995, Henzinger, et al. 1992a). In these on-the-fly algorithms, 
some symbolic data structures are used, which make the reachability analysis to be 
implemented in an efficient way.  
This chapter concentrates on the zone and Difference Bounded Matrix (DBM) 
data structures and the zone-based reachability algorithm that UPPAAL timed automata 
tool uses.  
3.1. Symbolic Data Structures 
In the implementation of timed automata, instead of clock regions, zones are used 
to obtain a finite representation of the infinite state space.  
Definition (Zone): Let    be the set of all clock valuations over a finite set of clocks  . 
A zone is a subset of    defined by a general clock constraint. 
A zone, which is simply a disjunction of inequalities between clock variables, is 
the maximal solution set of clock assignments satisfying some constraint. As an 
example, Figure 3.1 shows the zone defined by                      .  
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Figure 3.1. An example zone 
 
Given a timed automaton, its zone automaton can be constructed in a similar 
way as for the region automaton. Figure 3.2 gives the zone automaton for a timed 
automaton. As it is seen in the figure, unlike the region automaton, the symbolic states 
in the zone automaton have at most one successor for each event. Although zone 
automata may be bigger than region automata, in most cases zone automata have less 
number of states to explore. Because, the number of clock regions on a region 
automaton depends on the magnitudes of the constants of the clock constraints but the 
number of zones relatively is not affected by this fact (Alur 1999). 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Zone Automaton of a Timed Automaton 
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A symbolic state in a zone automaton can be shown as a pair      , where   is a 
location and   is the maximal set of clock assignments satisfying a clock constraint. 
Given a symbolic transition relation on the symbolic states; if the initial state 
          may lead to a set of final states according to the symbolic transition relation, 
all the final states         should be reachable according to concrete operational 
semantics (soundness). If a state is reachable according to concrete operational 
semantics, it should be possible to conclude this using the symbolic transition relation 
(completeness) (Bengtsson and Yi 2004). 
Zones can be efficiently represented in memory using Difference Bounded 
Matrices (DBM) that provides an easier implementation of zones. It allows testing for 
language inclusion of zones, computation of intersection of two zones, future of a zone, 
image of a zone after reset and the   approximation of a zone (Bengtsson and Yi 
2004, Bouyer and Laroussine 2008). 
Definition (Difference Bounded Matrix – DBM): A DBM for   clocks is an      -
square matrix of pairs                          . It keeps the upper bound 
for the difference of each pair of clocks where each element of the matrix is defined as: 
         
                              
           
  
A DBM                      defines a matrix, with    is always equal to   : 
                                              where     means there 
is no bound on it. For example, the zone defined by the equations              
         can be represented by: 
 
                 
               
               
  
The DBM representation of a zone is not unique. The canonical form of a DBM 
can be obtained by tightening the clock constraints by using the upper bounds on the 
clock differences.  
In practice, most of the upper bounds are redundant since some of the 
constraints may be derived from the other ones.  
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Definition (Minimal Constraint Systems): It is an equivalent reduced system of a 
constraint system with minimal number of constraints.  
 For all zones, finding their minimal constraint systems and storing them in 
memory may reduce the memory consumption. (Behrmann and Bengtsson 2002) gives 
more information on how to compute the minimal constraint system of a zone.  
3.2. Symbolic Reachability Analysis 
 For the verification of timed automata, a fundamental problem is the emptiness 
problem that is equivalent to the reachability problem that tests whether a state can be 
reached in a model. On-the-fly reachability algorithms calculate the states on-the-fly 
rather than pre-computing. Thus, only the needed part of state space is computed. The 
use of easy-to-implement structure DBMs and on-the-fly algorithms that glance 
symbolically on these structures make the timed automata implementable.  
The reachability analysis can be performed using forward or backward analyses. 
The backward analysis starts from final configurations, and computes the predecessors 
step-by-step iteratively. It checks whether an initial state is eventually computed or not. 
If such an initial state is computed, than goal location is reachable. Similarly, forward 
analysis starts from initial configurations and tries to reach some target by computing 
the successors. If such a final location is computed, it means that the goal location is 
reachable, and if not computed, it means that the goal location is not reachable. 
Theoretically, forward analysis algorithm termination is not guaranteed; however, it has 
the advantage that it is convenient for on-the-fly model checking with useful features 
like integer variables (Bengtsson and Yi 2004, Bouyer and Laroussine 2008, 
Mukhopadhyay and Podelski 1999). 
UPPAAL tool uses forward reachability analysis. Figure 3.3 gives the zone-
based symbolic reachability algorithm for timed automata. This algorithm keeps the 
     list holding the tuple of location and zone  s    to be visited. Starting from an 
initial location, we glance the states that are in the      list and insert the visited ones 
to the        list. If the zone   is a subset of a zone    in the        list, this will also 
be added there. Then, the state and zone tuples that are the successors of this state and 
zone are added to the      list since they are reached throughout the glancing of the 
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states. If the current state that we are examining is a final state, since it is reached, the 
reachability algorithm returns ―yes‖, otherwise returns ―false‖.  
The verification algorithm with forward analysis may have a termination 
problem since the relation   is not finite. In order to solve this problem, 
  normalization operation that guarantees the algorithm to terminate by limiting the 
number of computed zones is applied. The symbol    in the algorithm is used for the 
normalization operation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3. Algorithm for the Symbolic Reachability Analysis 
 
 Zone normalization uses the fact that once the clock value is greater than the 
maximal constant in the clock constraints, it is not important how greater it is.  -
normalization operation yields finitely many  -normalized zones defined by a  -
bounded constraints having constants between –   and  . Figure 3.4 gives the zone 
                  and its  -approximation for    .  
 
 
Figure 3.4. A Zone and its  -approximation 
         ,               
 while        do 
  take       from     
  if              then  
return ―YES‖ 
  if      for all                then 
   add       to        
   for all         such that                   do 
    add         to     
   end for 
  end if 
 end while 
 return ―NO‖ 
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 More detailed explanation on the zone normalization, possible problems with 
diagonal constraints and the normalization method to overcome the problem can be 
found in (Bouyer 2002, 2003, 2004, Bouyer, et al. 2005). Moreover, the implementation 
details of the normalization method, property checking and transformation operations to 
implement algorithms on DBMs are given in (Bengtsson and Yi 2004) and used in the 
verification engine of UPPAAL tool.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
MODELING AND VERIFICATION WITH TIMED 
AUTOMATA 
 
4.1. Formal Verification Methods  
 Formal verification is the study of proving or disproving that a system meets 
certain specifications, using formal methods. There are three basic steps for formal 
verification: (i) building a formal model of the system, (ii) stating the properties of the 
system to be verified in a specification language and (iii) proving whether the model is 
correct with respect to the specifications.  
Two main approaches for verification of systems are Theorem Proving and 
Model Checking. Theorem proving methods prove the general validity of a formula, by 
using logical inference. Model checking involves building a finite model of a system 
and checking that the model fulfills the desired property by traversing through all 
reachable states. Both methods are widely used for verification with some automated 
tools; however theorem proving methods can be quite troublesome and impractical for 
complex designs and model checking suffers from state space explosion. This study 
concentrates on model checking method (Clarke, et al. 1999), that has the advantages of 
being fully automatic, generating counter example in case of a negative result and not 
requiring complicated proofs to be written. 
 Timed automata allows for an efficient model checking method (Bouyer and 
Laroussine 2008) which can be used to analyze time-sensitive features such as 
execution times, communication times and response times. Similar to the other model 
checking methods, it checks a finite model of a system for correctness against some 
certain requirements. It works by exploring all possible state transitions from the initial 
state of the system to check whether a specified property is satisfied. It has some 
drawbacks caused by the generation of huge state spaces as explained in section 6.2.1, 
which can be understood better after the case study. This section gives brief information 
about how model checking is performed using timed automata, before moving on the 
case study on the modeling and verification of a security protocol. 
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4.2. Modeling with Timed Automata 
 The first task of model checking is, designing a formal model of the system to 
be verified. Timed automata formalism, models the system as a network of processes 
which is composed of several components each having a transition system, namely as a 
network of timed automata.  
A network of timed automata, that models a concurrent system, consists of some 
number of timed automata running in parallel that may communicate and synchronize 
on some events. It is possible to implement a product timed automata which represents 
this composite process of the network of timed automata.  
Definition (Product or Parallel Composition of Timed Automata): The product of 
the automata                         and                         is denoted as 
       , and defined as                                         , where 
  is defined by: 
 For        , for every                       and                   
   ,   has                                    
 For        , for every      
 
            and every   in   ,   has 
          
 
            
 For        , for every                   and every   in   ,   has 
                       
 Simply, in the product automata, the transitions of the timed automata that does 
not correspond a shared action are interleaved, and the transitions with a shared action 
are synchronized. Figure 4.1 illustrates a simple example of a product automaton. In this 
network of timed automata, there are two timed automata representing      and      
processes, which synchronize on       and      events. For instance, when the user 
presses the button, the door goes into the opening state and the user waits for the door to 
open. The product automaton is given below, which is the composite process of these 
two systems. The clock resets, guards and the invariants take place in the composite 
automata as given in the definition.  
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Figure 4.1. An Example Network of Timed Automata 
 
4.3. Specification and Verification with Timed Automata 
 To perform verification, the specifications that must be satisfied by the system 
should be stated in a formal specification language. Then, it is possible to use a formal 
verification method to check whether the model satisfies the requirements. Verification 
of an automata model can be performed using a homogenous or heterogeneous 
approach.  
 In homogenous approach, the requirements of a system are specified as an 
automaton, similar to the system itself. Then, the behavior of the system model 
and the specification automata are compared. Let us say that the specification is 
given as the automaton    and the implementation as   . Then, the 
implementation meets its specification iff            . In this case, 
verification problem reduces to the emptiness check of            . For 
untimed automata, the complementation is decidable and the method is 
straightforward. In case of timed automata, this problem can be solved 
algorithmically when    is given as a deterministic timed automaton. 
 The heterogeneous (or dual language) approach, combines the automata 
formalism with a descriptive formalism suitable for specifying its properties. For 
example, the timed automata tool KRONOS uses TCTL (Timed Computation 
Tree Logic) and UPPAAL uses CTL (Computation Tree Logic) to specify the 
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requirements. Then, a reachability check is performed on the model to test 
whether the automata model satisfies the requirements (Furia, et al. 2010). 
 Note that in both cases, on-the-fly reachability algorithms are used for emptiness 
and reachability checking since the problem is PSPACE-complete. Instead of pre-
computing the product automaton, it is computed and traversed on-the-fly, as explained 
in the previous chapter. 
4.4. A Timed Automata Tool: UPPAAL 
 UPPAAL (Bengtsson and Larsen 1996) is a timed automata tool developed by 
Uppsala and Aalborg Universities. It extends timed automata with C-like data types 
such as integers and arrays and allows using urgent and committed locations that ease 
the modeling of a system. It has rich documentation related to both its implementation 
details and usage which can be found in (Larsen and Pettersson 1997, Amnell and 
Behrmann 2001, Behrmann and Bengtsson 2002, Behrmann and David 2004, Behrmann 
et al. 2006). The tool is in continuous development since its first official beta version in 
1999. In this study, the latest version UPPAAL 4.0.11, released in February 2010 is 
used. 
 UPPAAL is freely available and it provides an integrated environment for 
modeling, validation and verification of real-time systems with a Java interface and C++ 
verification engine. It is an efficient and mature tool that has been used in many 
academic and industrial case studies including the modeling and verification of bounded 
retransmission protocol (D’Argenio, et al. 1996, 1997), a collision avoidance protocol 
(Jensen, et al. 1996), TDMA protocol startup mechanism (Lönn and Pettersson 1997), 
audio-video protocols (Bengtsson, et al. 1996, Havelund, et al. 1997, Bengtsson, et al. 
2002), a gear controller (Lindahl, et al. 1998), lip synchronization algorithm (Bowman, 
et al. 1998), a power controller (Havelund, et al. 1999), commercial field bus protocol 
(Wang and Yi 2000), QoS properties in multimedia streams (Bordbar and Okano 2003) 
and WAP gateway (Hessel and Pettersson 2006). Some recent studies (Corin, et al. 
2004, 2007) use UPPAAL for verification of security protocols such as Needham-
Shroeder and Yahalom authentication protocols.  
 
37 
 
4.4.1. Modeling with UPPAAL 
 A system can easily be modeled as a network of timed automata, using the 
graphical user interface and writing some simple C-like coding for system definitions. 
Then, the system execution can be simulated by visualizing the possible dynamic 
behaviors of the system.  
In the UPPAAL modeling language, the actions in a network of timed automata 
are partitioned into a set of input and output actions, which provide the communication 
between the automata. The output (or send) statement over channel   is denoted as    
(emission) and an input (or receive) statement over channel   is denoted as    
(reception). Two edges in different processes can synchronize if one is emitting and the 
other is receiving on the same channel. 
UPPAAL provides easy modeling of a system using C-like data structures, 
committed and urgent states and synchronization channels. It also allows transitions to 
have guards, synchronizations or updates and allows states to have location invariants. 
The syntax of these expressions and the restrictions on them are explained in detail in 
UPPAAL documentation (Behrmann and David 2004).  
 
 
Figure 4.2. An Example Timed Automaton Designed using UPPAAL 
 
Figure 4.2 gives a simple example of timed automata designed using UPPAAL. 
In the figure, the state with double border lines demonstrates that it is the initial state. 
When the automaton takes the input over the       channel, it goes into state    if the 
guard     is satisfied. When the transition is taken, it performs the specified updates. 
As it is seen, besides resetting clocks, UPPAAL has the advantage of calling functions 
and using assignment expressions as an update which allows for the easy modeling of a 
system. The state    has an invariant demonstrating that the automaton can stay in this 
state as long as     . 
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4.4.2. Specification and Verification with UPPAAL  
 UPPAAL automatically performs verification of timed automata models based 
on constraint solving and on-the-fly techniques. In case of a negative result, it generates 
a diagnostic trace that can be loaded to the simulator and examined how the property is 
violated.  
The properties to be checked with UPPAAL verification engine are specified 
using a subset of Computation Tree Logic (CTL). This query language consists of path 
and state formulas. 
State formulas describe side-effect free expressions that can be evaluated 
pertaining to a state (e.g.     , is true in a state whenever   equals  ). They can be 
used to test whether a process is in a particular state using expressions on the form    , 
where   is a process and   is a state. 
Deadlock-freedom is a special property for systems which are supposed to 
operate indefinitely. Absence of deadlock can be checked using a special state formula, 
                  . In general, deadlocks are states where the system is unable to 
progress further. The study in (Bowman and Gomez 2006) classifies the deadlocks in 
timed automata, as (i) pure-actionlocks, analogue to the deadlock in untimed 
specifications where the system cannot perform any action transitions but time can 
progress, (ii) time-actionlocks in which neither action nor time transitions can be 
performed and (iii) zeno-timelocks (also called pure timelocks) where a system can still 
perform transitions that may be action or time transitions but time cannot pass beyond a 
certain point. The state formula                    guarantees the absence of 
actionlocks. If this expression is not verified, the system may have a pure-actionlock or 
a time-actionlock. 
 Path formulas quantify over paths of the model. They can be classified into 
reachability, safety, liveness and bounded liveness properties (see Figure 4.3). 
 Reachability properties (something will possibly happen): Given a formula, 
they check, whether it can possibly be satisfied by any reachable state. For 
example for a security protocol, a reachability property may ask whether a 
process can enter the critical section. The path formula      is used to express 
there is a path that, starting from initial state, reaches a state where   is 
eventually satisfied.  
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 Safety properties (something bad will never happen): They are the properties 
required to always hold. For example, ―it cannot happen that both processes are 
in their critical sections simultaneously‖ defines a safety property. The path 
formulae        expresses that for all paths,   will always hold (something good 
is invariantly true), and the formulae        expresses that for some paths,   will 
eventually hold (there should exist a minimal path such that   is always true). 
 Liveness properties (something will eventually happen): These properties are 
characterized by the fact that no event can really violate them. The path formula 
     states that   is eventually satisfied. Besides this eventually liveness 
properties, a more useful form is the leadsto or response property. It is written as 
     that means whenever   is satisfied, then eventually   is satisfied. For 
example for a communication protocol, ―whenever a message has been sent then 
eventually it will be received‖ forms a liveness property. Bounded form of the 
liveness properties,               states that whenever   holds, then for all 
paths thereafter   must also hold within some time. Such a property can be: 
―whenever a message has been sent, then eventually it will be received within 
two time units‖.  
 
 
Figure 4.3. Path formula for Reachability, Safety and Liveness Properties 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
A CASE STUDY: USING TIMED AUTOMATA FOR 
MODELING AND VERIFICATION OF NEUMAN-
STUBBLEBINE REPEATED AUTHENTICATION 
PROTOCOL 
 
5.1. Related Work 
 Timed automata formalism is a widely used model for the verification of real 
time systems with many case studies including audio-video protocols, gear controller, 
lip synchronization algorithm and power controllers. This study focuses on the 
modeling and verification of security protocols using timed automata. 
Some recent studies analyze security protocols with quantitative timing 
properties involving the use of timed automata. The studies in (Jakubowska, et al. 2005, 
2008) examine Kerberos, TMN, Neumann-Stubblebine, Andrew Secure and Wide 
Mouthed Frog protocols by not modeling them directly as timed automata, but 
translating a language specification of a security protocol automatically to timed 
automata without integer variables. Then, the translated timed automata model is used 
as input for the model checker KRONOS (Yovine 1997) and VerICS (Dembinski, et al. 
2003). Similarly in (Benerecetti and Cuomo 2009), a model checking tool is presented 
which translates a security specification language into timed automata and uses the 
UPPAAL tool as the verification engine. Additionally, a case study on Wide Mouthed 
Frog protocol is provided.  
Similar to our case study, these studies perform verification using timed 
automata tools. However, our approach is closer to the studies in (Corin, et al. 2004, 
2007) which model Needham-Schroeder and Yahalom protocols directly with timed 
automata and use UPPAAL tool for verification. Our case study models Neuman-
Stubblebine repeated authentication protocol which allows for employing the key 
expiration time in the model. Since it is a large protocol involving two parts, the model 
tends to grow enormously. Directly modeling provides us full control over the timed 
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automata model and also enables us to make use of the full expressiveness and data 
structures of UPPAAL. Moreover, we are not required to have an expertise on a 
specification language to model a protocol.  
5.2. Modeling Security Protocols using Timed Automata 
Timed automata provide a model close to the real system. A timed automata 
model for a protocol can be generated by building a finite state machine whose states 
and transitions simulate the behavior of the protocol principals. Then, all possible 
execution traces are explored to analyze whether the protocol has some security flaws.  
Model checking a protocol involves an analysis based on the protocol 
specification, independent of the cryptographic operations. Hence, the cryptosystem is 
assumed to be perfect and the mathematical details of the cryptology are abstracted 
away. It is focused on the protocol steps and the protocol messages sent by the 
principals. Since we are related to the sequence of steps in the protocol specification, 
the flaws related to the different combinations of the messages are examined by 
modeling an intruder which aims to attack the protocol. 
Modeling cryptology may require some coding such as assigning and testing 
some local/global variables and performing some operations. UPPAAL makes it easier 
to model a protocol directly with timed automata since it allows such simple coding. 
Performing most of the operations as the updates of the transitions and checking the 
values of the variables in the guards to decide whether they comply with the protocol 
specification are very helpful to model a protocol. 
To create a model of the protocol, it is crucial to examine the description of the 
protocol and the behavior of the principals. In a server involved authentication protocol 
such as the Neuman-Stubblebine authentication protocol used in our case study, the 
initiator  , authenticates itself to the responder  , using the trusted authentication server 
 ; and obtains a session key to communicate with  . By modeling each principal as an 
automaton, a network of timed automata is obtained which models the protocol 
execution. Note that a network of timed automata deadlocks if no more transitions can 
be involved in a run. Hence, a behaviour that is not specified in the protocol, causes a 
deadlock and does not generate the complete the protocol execution trace. 
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The principals  ,   and   communicate with each other by sending or receiving 
some messages over the network. The messaging can be modeled by using binary 
synchronization channels. The sender automaton emits an output signal that will be 
captured by another automaton receiving the signal. The message sent/received can be 
kept in a global variable so that each principal automaton can access the message 
variable. Figure 5.1 demonstrates a general view for the network of timed automata. For 
example, when the initiator emits the           signal, this means that it has created 
and sent the message (it also assigns the message to the global message variable). The 
network takes this message over           and emits           signal, which is 
captured by the responder over          . Then, the responder accesses the global 
message variable and reads it. 
 
 
Figure 5.1. General View of Automata for Principals and the Network 
 
5.3. Neuman-Stubblebine Repeated Authentication Protocol 
Neuman-Stubblebine protocol (Neuman and Stubblebine 1993) is an 
authentication protocol that involves a session key exchange and mutual authentication 
between two principals. Our study performs a case study on this protocol since it is a 
repeated protocol that involves an expiration time that can be studied using timed 
automata and it requires less number of message transfers then the similar nonce-based 
Kehne-Langendorfer-Schoenwalder repeated authentication protocol (Schonwalder, et 
al. 1992).  
The protocol consists of two parts. First, the initial authentication part is 
executed which provides mutual authentication. In this part, the initiator acquires a 
ticket to be used in the subsequent part of the protocol. The subsequent part is used to 
Initiator Responder Server 
init_msg! serv_msg! 
serv_msg? 
resp_msg! 
resp_msg? 
Network 
init_msg? 
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re-authenticate the principal identities without using the server. This part can be 
repeated several times until the ticket expires. 
The following symbols are used in the protocol specification given for the initial 
and subsequent authentication parts: 
  ,   and   are the principals where   is the key distribution server.  
   ,   ,    , and     are the nonces. 
    ,    , and     are the keys where the subscript letters denote the principals 
whom the key is for (For example     is shared between   and the server  ). 
    is the expiration time for the session key.  
        means,   concatenated with  , encrypted with the key  . 
 
1. Initial Authentication Part: 
 The initial part requires the exchange of four protocol messages.   initiates the 
protocol by sending its identity   and a nonce   . After   receives this message, it 
sends its identity and a nonce created by   as clear text and  ’s name, nonce and a 
suggested expiration time for the credentials as a block encrypted with the key    . The 
server can decrypt this message since it knows    , and assures that they are created by 
 . Then, the server sends   a ticket, and  ’s nonce. It also sends the identity of  ,  ’s 
nonce, a session key    , the expiration time    encrypted with    .   decrypts the 
block encrypted with    and verifies the    is same with the    in message  . In the 
last message, it sends the ticket and    to  , proving its identity. 
1.              
2.                            
3.                                           
4.                               
 This initial authentication provides mutual authentication between the principals. 
After this initial part, the initiator   possesses the ticket              and the session 
key     that can be used for subsequent authentications. 
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2. Subsequent Authentication Part: 
 In this second part,   uses the ticket to authenticate itself to the responder.   
checks the sender’s identity, shared key and the expiration time of the ticket. If it is 
valid, the authentication is provided between the principals. 
1.                            
2.               
 
      
3.                  
The Neuman-Stubblebine protocol is exposed to some security flaws (Clark and 
Jacob 1997, Hwang, et al. 1995). 
Attack 1: The initial part of the protocol is exposed to a type flaw attack, where the 
responder   accepts the nonce    as the key    . 
1.                 
2.                               
3.         
4.                               
Attack 2: The subsequent part of the protocol is subject to a parallel session attack. 
Here, the initial ticket is recorded from a legitimate run of the protocol. 
1.                               
2.                 
 
      
1'.                                
2'.                          
3.                     
 
 Our case study focuses on the modeling the protocol as a network of timed 
automata composed of the protocol principals and an intruder, then examines whether 
our timed automata model is able to detect the flaws on the protocol.  
5.4. Modeling the Neuman-Stubblebine Initial Part 
In the first step of the protocol modeling, the initial authentication part, which 
requires the transmission of four messages, is modeled. Then, the model for the 
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subsequent part that requires three messages for re-authentication is generated. Finally, 
these two parts are combined and a complete model for the protocol is obtained. 
5.4.1. Modeling Assumptions 
 Our timed automata model has the following assumptions: 
 The principals show no behavior other than the behavior described in the 
protocol specification 
 Principals know their secret keys they use with server 
 A kind of black box security protocol analysis approach (Cremers 2006) is used 
in the protocol modeling. Cryptographic functions are considered as abstract 
black boxes, immune to cryptanalysis. Perfect cryptology is assumed such that:  
o Nobody can decrypt the messages unless they know the secret keys.  
o A ciphertext      can be generated by principal possessing  and  . 
o Nobody can guess the secret keys or newly generated nonces. 
 The medium does not introduce errors, message modification can only occur in 
the existence of an intruder. 
 The intruder has the capabilities of the powerful Dolev - Yao intruder (Dolev 
and Yao 1981) which has the ability to eavesdrop, replay, modify or inject 
messages. All communication is assumed to occur over an insecure network. 
 Network delays are not taken into consideration since they are negligible with 
respect to the time consuming operations such as encryption or decryption. 
5.4.2. Modeling Cryptology 
 Since the cryptosystem is assumed to be perfect, we used an abstraction for the 
cryptographic operations. These cryptographic abstractions are held in the local 
functions of each principal,            ,                                and 
                               , described in local declarations of each automata. 
Each principal can call these functions when needed in the protocol execution 
and the result of the operation is assigned in their local variable       . During the 
execution of these operations, time elapses, so when one of these functions is called, the 
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principal goes in a new state and gets the result in the specified amount of time. Here, 
we make use of the advantage of the timed automata that can model the delay and 
deadline requirements. A principal’s automaton will have the states and transitions as 
given in Figure 5.2, to generate a nonce, perform encryption or decryption. The states 
marked with ―C‖ are the committed states where the transition is taken as soon as we 
enter the state and time does not pass. The states in the middle are not committed since 
they allow the passage of time during the cryptographic operations. 
  
 
Figure 5.2. Timed Automata for Cryptographic Operations 
 
A message sent/received by a principal is represented as an integer, which 
contains the information described in the protocol specification. As it is seen in the 
protocol specification, a protocol message consists of a combination of the agent ids, 
nonces or encrypted blocks. The creation of the messages and the encryption/decryption 
model used in the case study are similar to the model used in (Corin, et al. 2004, 2007). 
Nonce Generation: 
In the modeling of the initial authentication, the initiator and the responder each 
generates one nonce value by calling their             function. This function returns 
a result by incrementing the global       variable. 
Encryption/Decryption: 
Two arrays       and     are used for encryption and decryption, where the 
first one holds the plaintexts and the latter holds the keys. When a block is encrypted, 
the plaintext is placed in the       array and the key is placed in the     array. The 
corresponding index is returned as the ciphertext, which is the result of the encryption.  
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Figure 5.3 shows an example scheme. Here,    which has the value    is 
encrypted by using the key       . Let us say that the current index value is  . Then, 
when the function                 is called,          will contain the value    and 
       will contain   . Decryption is performed again by using these arrays. Let us say 
that                    is called with         and       . Then,        will be 
compared to the value of    ; in other words it is checked whether the specified key is 
correct. If this key is not same with the corresponding key of the ciphertext, then the 
block cannot be decrypted. If it is same with the value in       , then the block can be 
decrypted, in other words          is returned as the plaintext which has the value   . 
 
 
Figure 5.3. Modeling Encryption and Decryption 
 
Representing Protocol Variables: 
As mentioned above, a protocol message is represented as an integer in the 
model. UPPAAL uses 16 bit integers where the leftmost bit is the sign bit. In order to 
contain the whole message in an integer and have simplicity in the model, it is 
necessary to limit the number of bits to represent the blocks contained in a message. To 
figure out the number of bits to use for each variable, the largest message and the largest 
block to be encrypted/decrypted (since the plaintexts will be contained in an integer 
array, they also must not exceed the size of the integer) is taken into the consideration. 
The largest message of the protocol is in the third step of the protocol, server   sends   
the message:                                         . and the largest block in 
the protocol specification is                  . It is seen that, the message can at most 
contain two encrypted blocks and a nonce; and the largest block contains an identity, a 
nonce, a key and an expiration time value.  
plain key 
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ciphertext: 7 
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In order not to exceed the number of bits of an integer, the nonces, keys and the 
indices (in other words, ciphertexts or encrypted blocks) are represented by using four 
bits. The agent ids and the    are represented by two bits to be able to fit the message 
content in an integer. Representing the ids with two bits does not create a problem since 
the initiator, the responder and the intruder has the agent ids    ,     and     
respectively. However, the time duration that can be represented by only two bits is not 
enough to complete the protocol execution; because the protocol needs at least eight 
time units to finish the execution even if each cryptographic operation is assumed to 
take one time unit. Hence, the expiration time is used as       in the calculations.  
The keys shared between the principals     and     are defined as           
   , where             . In the implementation, the possible values for the nonces, 
id’s, indexes and keys are restricted (see Table 5.1) since there may be some problems 
in the model when some of these values coincide. In section 6.2.2, it is explained why 
some predefined values are used and what would be the problems when they coincide. 
 
Table 5.1. Variables and Their Values Used in Cryptology Modeling 
Identities (A, B, Intruder) 1, 2, 3 
Secret Keys (Kas, Kbs, Kab) 11,12,13 
Nonce Values
*
 10, 14,15 
Index Values [4, 9] 
0 means a value is not set or wrong 
* 1 and 2 are also used as nonces for the subsequent part of the protocol 
 
The lengths of these variables are                            
                  and                               . To reduce the state 
space of the intruder (see section 6.2.1) and have simplicity in the model, instead of 
these six variables, only two global length variables             and             
are used in our model. These values do not change during the execution and they are 
defined as constant integers which makes us save from space.  
Creating and Reading Messages: 
 Up to now, it is decided on the number of bits to represent each part of a 
message and how to encrypt/decrypt blocks with a secret key. Now we can go on with 
how to create and read messages.  
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A message is created and read by using shift and    operations (Corin, et al. 
2004, 2007). Parts of the protocol message are appended to the message by shifting the 
message to the left as the length of the part that will be appended. Then, the new part is 
appended using the    operation. Hence a message is created and ready to be sent. To 
extract information from a received message, shift and     operations are used. This 
time the message is shifted to the right and the     operation with the mask is applied. 
The mask variables are also defined as global constant integers similar to the length 
variables used to obtain the specified number of rightmost bits: 
                                 and                                 
For example, when   wants to create the message      , it shifts    left for         
times, and    s the result with   . Figure 5.4 demonstrates how to create this message 
and Figure 5.5 shows how the server reads the message   of the protocol. 
 
 
Figure 5.4. Creating a Message 
 
 
Figure 5.5. Reading a Message 
now,   knows   and  . Then,   decrypts              by calling 
                       where              ,         
and extracts  ,   and    from the plaintext in a similar way. 
S reads the message                        
                       
               
                                   
                              
                    
                    
                    
                    
  creates the message             
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5.4.3. Initiator, Responder and Server Automata 
In the Neuman-Stubblebine protocol, the messages are transferred between the 
initiator, responder and the trusted server. The steps of the protocol are implemented by 
mainly these three automata, that model the creation of messages, sending and receiving 
messages, extracting information and checking them using its knowledge. 
The knowledge bases of the principals are modeled using the local variables of 
each principal. For example, the principal   has     as the initial knowledge. Then, it 
generates   , owns a ticket, learns    , and    and these values are added to this 
principal’s knowledge base. The principal  , has     as the initial knowledge and gets a 
claimed id,   , generates   ,    and learns    . It should keep this knowledge to be 
used in the later steps of the protocol (e.g. while checking the values received in the 
fourth step of the message). Hence, it is necessary to keep each principal’s knowledge 
in their local variables. 
In order to be able to analyze the timing properties, each principal automaton 
has its local clock variable to keep the time elapsed for the cryptographic operations and 
check timeouts, in addition to a global clock representing the total time passed. 
The Initiator: 
 The initiator  , involves in the following three steps of the protocol: 
1.              
3.                                           
4.                               
 The Initiator automaton is given in Figure 5.6, which is activated by the      
automaton that emits the        signal. The Initiator, first generates a nonce which is 
performed as given in Figure 5.2. It creates the message      by assigning the message 
to the global variable     and signals           to indicate that it has sent the 
message. This signal will be captured by the network and will be transmitted to the 
responder. After sending the message, in state   , initiator waits for the protocol 
message   from the server. When the message                                   is 
sent by the server, the network emits           which will be captured by the 
          of the initiator that brings it to state   . In this transition, initiator gets the 
block encrypted with    , the ticket which is              , and   . It decrypts the 
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block with the key     which is shared by the initiator and the server. Decryption of a 
block is performed by its function similar to the generation of a nonce. Since it is a time 
consuming operation, time elapses during decryption. So, we use a location invariant in 
the state that waits for decryption. The transition from    to   , has a guard. In order to 
take the transition, besides the time constraint,  ’s identity sent by the server must be 
same as the identity that   wants to communicate with, and the nonce value must be 
same as the one generated and sent by itself. If this guard is satisfied, the initiator gets 
the     and    values and encrypts    with    . Then, it creates the message 
                      by concatenating the ticket and this encrypted block, emits the 
          signal indicating that it has sent the message. After this step, the initial 
authentication execution finishes for the initiator and it sets its local variable         to 
    , which will be used for verification step. 
 
 
Figure 5.6. The Initiator Automaton for the Initial Authentication Part 
 
 Let us assume that the initiator has received a wrong message from the server in 
the third step. Then, since the    will be different from the one the initiator itself 
generated, the guard will not be satisfied and the transition from state    to    will not 
be taken. Hence, the automata will deadlock and the         value will be   which 
means that there is something wrong with the execution of the protocol. 
 In the automaton, some states are defined as committed since it allows for 
accurate modeling of atomic behaviors and avoids unnecessary interleavings.    and 
   are such committed states. On the other hand, there are some states such as    and 
   where time should elapse in some states such as or interleavings should be allowed. 
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 From the point of analysis of timeouts, some modifications on state    can be 
proposed where the initiator waits for the protocol message 3. Total time waited for this 
message can be measured in order to be used for the analysis of possible attacks. Figure 
5.7 shows the changes in states   ,    and in their transitions. The local variable 
         , keeps the time waited for the message which is incremented when the local 
clock    becomes  . This time recording is performed until the timeout is reached since 
the protocol run does not continue when the message does not arrive in timeout interval. 
The guard       in the transition outgoing from A5 ensures that           is 
incremented each time    gets   by preventing the automaton to take this transition 
before incrementing          for the last time unit. 
 
 
Figure 5.7. Measuring the Time Waited for a Message 
 
 Note that, in the initial authentication part of our case study, only the waiting 
time for the Responder automaton is included in the model since it is used to detect the 
attack of the protocol and we have state space explosion problem when we included 
these transitions in both principals. 
The Responder: 
 The responder  , involves in the following three steps of the protocol: 
1.              
2.                            
4.                               
 The automaton for responder   is given in Figure 5.8. It starts the protocol 
execution after it gets the first protocol message over           signal. The creation 
of the automaton is performed in a similar way as for the initiator. 
53 
 
 As for the timeout interval, in state   ,   waits for the protocol message  , 
                      from  . The variable           keeps the total time waited for 
the message which is incremented when the local clock    becomes  . This part is 
similar to the piece of automata given in Figure 5.7 and used for protocol verification 
using timing information. 
The responder   finishes its execution by setting its local variable         to  , 
which means that the claimed identity is authenticated, only if the last protocol message 
is correct. This check is done using a guard and the transition to state   . If the values 
are correct, it gets the key    , decrypts the block         to check whether it is same 
with the nonce generated by itself. 
 
 
Figure 5.8. The Responder Automaton for the Initial Authentication Part 
 
The Server: 
 The server  , involves in the following two steps of the protocol: 
2.                            
3.                                           
 The server automaton, given in the Figure 5.9, is only involved in the initial 
authentication and no addition to the automaton is done for the subsequent 
authentication part.  
The server initially knows its shared keys between principals which is calculated 
by                   . It performs key distribution between two principals 
(having ids     and    ), which are generated by                      .  
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Figure 5.9. The Server Automaton 
 
In the model, in order to reduce the state space of the intruder, some more 
guards are introduced in the Intruder automata, indicating the current step of the 
protocol execution. For this aim, the principals keep track of the protocol steps they 
have executed, in terms of the sent and received messages. The variables       , 
       and        are added to the initiator, responder and the server automata 
respectively, to use in these guards. The values of these variables denote that: 
           has sent the protocol message   
           has received the protocol message   
           has sent the protocol message   
           has received the protocol message   
           has sent the protocol message   
           has received the protocol message   
           has received the protocol message   
           has sent the protocol message   
5.4.4. Dolev-Yao Intruder 
 The flaws of a security protocol are examined by modeling an intruder (also 
called attacker, spy or enemy) who wants to exploit the features of a protocol. The 
Dolev-Yao intruder model (Dolev and Yao 1981) is an easily applicable intruder model 
that is frequently used in the formal verification methods. This model assumes that the 
intruder has the full control of network and delivers the messages sent from one identity 
to another. 
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The Dolev-Yao intruder has the abilities to: 
 Deliver Messages - transmit the message to the intended recipient without any 
modification. 
 Block Messages - intercept a message by not delivering it to its recipient.  
 Decompose Messages - decompose an overheard message and improve its 
knowledge using the constituent parts of the received messages. The message 
can still be delivered to intended recipient, without alteration. 
 Perform Encryption/Decryption - encrypt or decrypt the information in its 
knowledge base. (Note that decryption is possible only if he knows the correct 
secret key. He also cannot guess the keys or the generated nonces.) 
 Compose Fake Messages - derive new messages by composing some 
constituent parts or encrypted/decrypted blocks. 
The intruder automaton should be able to represent the knowledge of the Dolev-
Yao intruder which can be used to compose fake messages. The intruder’s knowledge 
includes the identities of the principals, its own keys and nonces, origin and destination 
of all messages, the states of all principals. In addition since it can read all the messages, 
it also knows every part of the messages, everything it can generate by encrypting 
something with something that may be used as a key, everything it can generate by 
decrypting something (provided that it knows the correct key) and every concatenation 
of data it knows. 
Our intruder automaton is composed of the pieces of automata each fulfilling the 
one of the capabilities listed above. 
5.4.4.1. Delivering the Messages 
The piece of automaton given in Figure 5.10 models the message transmission. 
Here, it is seen that the messages can be received by the network from the initiator over 
the           channel, from the responder over the           channel and from the 
server over the           channel where these signals are emitted by the principals 
when they have sent a message. On the other direction, these received messages can be 
transmitted to the initiator over the           channel, to the receiver over the 
          channel or to the server over the           channel. It can be seen that a 
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message can be sent to any principal using this automaton. Hence, besides the correct 
recipient, it is possible to send a message to any principal that the intruder wants. When 
one of the output signals are emitted by the network, the corresponding principal 
captures the signal and understands that the message is sent to him. Then, it reads the 
message which is kept in the global variable   .  
 
 
Figure 5.10. A Simple Network Model 
 
Note that the intruder may also have the ability to create and send its own 
messages; hence the dotted transition can also be employed. In our protocol model, if 
the intruder needs to send its own message, then it receives a signal over a channel, 
discards it and sends its own message. However, in the full protocol model including 
both the initial and subsequent parts, the intruder may learn the secret key in the initial 
part and use it by initiating the execution of subsequent part. To initiate a 
communication, this transition is needed and employed in the complete protocol model, 
which is given in section 5.8. 
5.4.4.2. Decomposing Messages 
 The intruder can capture the messages, decompose them into its constituent parts 
and add to its knowlegde base. For example, when the message  ,    is captured by the 
intruder, it has the ability to read the initiator’s identity and its nonce   , hence, learns 
them. The piece of timed automata given in Figure 5.11 is used to enable the intruder 
improve its knowledge by adding the information extracted from the messages sent.  
57 
 
 
Figure 5.11. Intruder Decomposing Messages 
 
In fact, the intruder can nondeterministically take one of the transitions from    
to    to read a message. However, this increases the state space so large that it gets 
impossible to verify some queries. Because of that, in order to limit the possible number 
of transitions, we added some guards to these transitions. This guards restrict the 
transitions to be taken only if the corresponding protocol step has been executed. It is 
important that these limitations do not lessen the power of the intruder, but decreases 
the number of infeasible executions which make the state space grow enormously. 
In the figure, there are four transitions that may be taken when one of the four 
steps of the protocol’s initial authentication is executed. For example the intruder can 
examine the message      only if           which means that   has sent the first 
protocol message     . It is also avoided to take the same transition again once the 
intruder added the contents of a message to its knowledge base.  
5.4.4.3. Performing Encryption and Decryption 
The intruder has the ability to generate a nonce, do encryption and decryption 
using the parameters in its knowledge base. Here it is important to model the intruder 
such that it cannot guess the principals’ nonces, secret keys and cannot decrypt a 
message without knowing the key (due to the perfect cryptosystem assumption).  
The piece of automata given in Figure 5.12 selects the parameters to apply 
encryption or decryption. It can use any variable in its knowledge base by 
nondeterministically selecting the plaintext/ciphertext and the key. Again, to avoid a 
state space explosion, the guards are used which allow the use of a variable only if it is 
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set (it is not set if the value of a variable is  . See Table 5.1 for the possible values of 
the variables). In this automaton,  ,   and   are the identities,    is the nonce generated 
by the intruder. 
 
 
Figure 5.12. Intruder Parameter Selection for Encryption/Decryption 
 
5.4.4.4. Composing Fake Messages 
The Dolev-Yao intruder can also create new messages and inject them into the 
network. So, the model will be expanded with a message creation part for the intruder, 
where it can populate each constituent part of a message with some known information. 
Figure 5.13 shows that piece of timed automaton. A local variable       is used to 
keep some constituent parts which is initially  . While creating a new message,       
can be set to any variable that the intruder knows. Then, in order to append a new 
content to the message, it can be shifted left for         or         times depending 
on the length of the content to be appended. 
 
 
Figure 5.13. Intruder Deriving New Messages 
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Note that in section 5.4.2, it is mentioned that only two length variables are used 
to reduce the state space of the intruder. If it was not reduced, there would be more 
number of transitions from     to     which causes the state space to increase 
enormously (see Figure 6.2). 
By using this message creation part, the intruder can generate any messages 
using its knowledge or the result which is obtained as the result of an encryption or 
decryption operation. 
5.4.4.5. The Dolev-Yao Intruder Model 
Our Dolev-Yao intruder model (see Figure 5.14) combines all these features 
where the intruder can deliver, block, decompose messages, perform 
encryption/decryption on nondeterministically selected parameters and generate fake 
messages using its knowledge base.  
 
 
Figure 5.14. The Intruder Model for the Initial Authentication Part 
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The automata parts of the intruder are merged in a way that it enables the 
possible executions of the intruder. For example, the intruder can append more than one 
encrypted blocks to a new message. Then, a transition should be added from the 
message creation part to the parameter selection part for encryption/decryption.  
The model contains many loops and it can perform as many operations as it 
wants. This enlarges the state space so that the model verification goes out of memory. 
So, the number of operations that intruder may perform is restricted by the variable 
      . Nonce generation, encryption, decryption and shifting for message creation 
increments the number of operations performed. The intruder cannot perform more than 
       number of these operations. Note that this number should not be so large to 
cause state space explosion and should not be so small to by-pass a possible attack.  
In addition, the model should prevent possible errors. For example a possible 
error caused by data loss may occur when the data is right shifted although its rightmost 
bits contain data. This can be avoided by using a guard that checks if the rightmost bits 
to be shifted contain data or not.  
In the generation and explanation of the model, a possible state space explosion 
is frequently mentioned and considered. It is a very struggling problem for model 
checking that we came up with which is explained in section 6.2.1 in detail. 
5.5. Validation and Verification of Neuman-Stubblebine Initial Part 
Validation of a model is concerned with building the right model that correctly 
represents the behaviors of the real world system. The generated model should 
implement the protocol execution in order to have the correct verification results. 
Verification of a model is concerned with building the model right. A security 
protocol must satisfy some requirements in order to provide a secure communication 
between the principals. However, many protocols are shown to be flawed. Hence, a 
security protocol should be verified to check if it satisfies its requirements. 
This section gives the validation and verification results for our Neuman-
Stubblebine Repeated Authentication Protocol model obtained using UPPAAL. 
Note that, for the initial part, the automata for the principals are named as 
           ,            ,        and           ; for the subsequent part, they are 
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named as            ,             and           . For the complete model, these 
automata are merged as the          ,          ,        and          automata. 
5.5.1. Parameters and Configurations used in the Case Study 
Verification of a specification can be performed by using either UPPAAL’s 
graphical user interface or the stand-alone command line verifier. In this study, the 
verifier is executed using the command line, which is more appropriate for verifying 
large tasks. The verifier reads in the      file (which is automatically generated by the 
tool during the graphical design) and checks whether it satisfies the query in the file 
given in a file with    extension. The following command form is used execute the 
verifier from the command line: 
                                            
The options to specify may be related to state space representation, state space 
reduction, search order and trace options (Behrmann and David 2004). Since our model 
is large and needs large amount of memory, the following options to reduce memory 
consumption is used in this study (the non-listed properties are used with their default 
stand-alone command line verifier configurations): 
 State Space Representation: Minimal Constraint Systems  
This representation uses less memory than DBMs.  
 State Space Reduction: Aggressive Space Optimization  
This optimization may take more time but uses less memory by decreasing the 
number of states stored. (    option) 
 Search Order: Breadth First Search  
Depth first search cannot complete the verification of some of our queries since 
it runs out of memory where breadth first search generally finds out the 
diagnostics traces faster. 
 Trace Options: Generate Some Trace  
The diagnostic traces of each property are generated and written in a     file 
which can be read by the simulator so that they can be viewed on the model. In 
this study, –    and –    options are used to generate some or shortest traces. 
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In addition,    option is used to see the number of states stored and explored 
during the verification process. To measure the time passed during the verification, the 
     command in Linux is used which prints the execution time of a process. As an 
example, the following line can be executed to verify the queries in           on the 
model in             and writes the diagnostic trace into the              file. 
                 –    –                                       
The verification is performed on Ubuntu      Operating System on Intel Core  
Duo      ,          processor and     of RAM.  
5.5.2. Validation and Simulation of the Model 
To ensure the correctness of our model, it is validated by checking whether the 
protocol works as specified. In a successful run of the protocol, the initiator 
authenticates itself to the responder at the end of the protocol execution, and both of 
these principal’s         variables should be set to  . Query 1 is used to test whether 
the model is able to generate the correct run of the protocol. 
Query 1: Is such a state reachable where both the initiator and the responder finish the 
protocol execution? 
                                              
Query 1 is satisfied and the correct protocol execution is simulated successfully.  
5.5.3. Verification of the Neuman-Stubblebine Initial Part 
In this study, the correctness of an authentication protocol is aimed to be verified 
based on the goals of an authentication protocol. Two high level goals for an 
authentication protocol are listed as follows in (Woo and Lam 1994): 
 Authentication: For each principal, after the successful run of the protocol, it 
should be assured that it is talking to the principal in its mind. 
 Key establishment: A shared secret becomes available to the principals, for 
subsequent cryptographic use. 
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The possible attacks for the Neuman-Stubblebine protocol are analyzed by 
writing specifications derived from these authentication goals. In order to examine the 
protocol goals given above, the correspondence and the secrecy properties should be 
verified.  
Correspondence means that the execution of different principals in an 
authentication protocol proceeds in a lock-stepped fashion. While the authenticating 
principal finishes its part of the protocol, the authenticated principal must have been 
present and participated in its part of the protocol.  
Secrecy property specifies that a distributed session key cannot be discovered by 
the intruder. In the analysis of these goals, if an attack is found on a protocol, it is 
inferred that the protocol is incorrect since it does not satisfy the properties that it is 
intended for.  
 This section gives these specifications and the UPPAAL queries that we used to 
check whether our protocol model satisfies these properties.  
Query 2: Is such a state reachable where the responder has finished but the initiator 
has not finished the initial protocol execution? 
                                                 
Query 2 is related to the correspondence property. Here, it is used the fact that 
this property is not satisfied when the responder finishes the protocol execution 
although the initiator has not executed its part. In such a situation, one can say that an 
intruder has sent fake messages to the responder and attacked to the protocol. However, 
this property is satisfied. It means that the intruder caused the responder to finish its run 
by sending fake messages and we have found an attack on the protocol.  
The diagnostic trace generated by UPPAAL (written in an .xtr file) is loaded 
into its simulator to be able to view the transitions and the operations performed. The 
transitions of the principal automata, the content of the     variable and the operations 
to create the message are examined to find out the execution of the attack scenerio. 
From the diagnostic trace, it is seen that this is the execution trace of the type 
flaw attack given in section 5.3. In this execution, after the responder sends the message 
to the server, the intruder (in Figure 5.14) extracts the information in messages   and   
in the transitions from    to   , and learns   ,   , and             (kept in its variable 
         ). It skips the protocol message  . To create a fake message, it takes 
          into the       variable between the states    ,     and    . Then, it selects 
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   as        and    as       , to encrypt    with   . It composes this encrypted 
block with           and sends it to the responder as the protocol message  . In this 
attack,   accepts the nonce    as the key    . As it is seen, a type flaw attack 
(substitution of a different type of message field) can be detected since the types of 
constituent parts for the encryption, decryption or message creation operations are not 
restricted. The intruder has the ability to make a composition of any of these variables 
that may be accepted by the responder as a correct message.  
The next query is related to the secrecy property. The next query verifies the 
distribution of the key (at the end of the protocol execution, the secret key     is 
generated by the server and distributed to the initiator and the responder) and the 
secrecy of this key by checking whether it can be learned by the intruder. The check is 
performed using the       variable in order to include all the decomposed pieces of the 
messages and their encryptions or decryptions.  
Query 3: The execution of the protocol run leads to the fact that, the secret key 
generated by the server is distributed to the protocol principals, and it cannot be 
learned by the intruder.  
                                                                
                                                                
                    
The property is satisfied, meaning that all the executions where the initiator and 
the responder finished the initial part lead to the equivalence of     s owned by them 
and this secret key cannot be obtained by the intruder. (Note that this property is true for 
the correct execution of the protocol in which both the initiator and the responder 
finishes their protocol execution.) 
In the next queries, the aim is to find out whether the timing information can be 
used to analyze the attacks on a protocol. The timeout intervals - the time periods that a 
principal waits for a message - can be used for this purpose. If a message comes earlier 
than the required time to prepare a message (depending on the encryption/decryption 
times), then it can be said that the principal has received a fake message (Corin, et al. 
2004, 2007).  
In a normal run (see Figure 5.15.a), assuming the time to create or read a 
message is negligible, the timeout for the responder is:  
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1.   sends message 1 to   
2.   performs encryption, sends message 2 to   
3.   performs decryption, then two encryptions, sends message   to   
4.   performs a decryption and an encryption, sends message 4 to   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.15. Normal (a) and Attacked (b) Message Flows of the Protocol 
 
However, in a flawed run, the message can be received in a shorter time: 
                                          (illustrated in Figure 5.15.b, where 
the letter   in paranthesis indicate that the message comes from/goes to the intruder). 
1.   sends message 1 to   (intruder reads the content) 
2.   performs decryption, sends message 2 to   
3. Intruder captures and reads the message, performs an encryption, creates and 
sends a fake message 4 to   
In our model, it is assumed that the time needed for the encryption and 
decryption are the same for all principals. To measure the duration of time until the 
message is received, a local variable          is used which is incremented at each 
time unit the responder waits (see Figure 5.8, state   ). Query 4 tests for a possible 
attack using the fact that if the message comes earlier than the required time for the 
cryptographic operations, then we can say that there is an attack on the protocol. 
Initiator        Responder      Server Initiator(I)      Responder     Server(I) 
The fake message 
arrives too early 
than the timeout. 
(b) (a) 
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Query 4: Is such a state reachable where the responder has finished the protocol 
execution but the message has been received in a shorter time than the required time for 
the correct protocol execution? 
                                                                  
                                                                      
This query is satisfied meaning that such a state is reachable. The diagnostic 
trace causing an earlier message is the execution trace of the attack detected in Query 2. 
Hence, it can be inferred that the attacks can also be detected by examining the 
quantitative timing information of the protocol. 
In some protocols, a constraint on           can be used to prevent a specific 
attack. For example, if the intruder needed more number of encryptions and decryptions 
than the normal run to perform an attack, then it would be possible to limit           
in a way that leaving no space for the executions of the intruder (such as the example 
given in (Corin, et al. 2007)). However, this is not the case in our protocol. The 
constraint                                     does not prevent this attack 
since the intruder can wait for a while before sending the message. 
In an authentication protocol, the timeout intervals can be examined for both the 
initiator and the responder. As we mentioned in section 5.4.3, only the waiting time for 
the responder automaton is included in our model since it is provides the detection the 
attack of the protocol and we have state space explosion problem when such transitions 
are included in both principals. 
The timeout for the initiator can be analyzed by modifying the initiator automata 
in Figure 5.6 as in Figure 5.7 and removing the transitions counting           from the 
responder automata to avoid state space explosion. On that model, Query 5 can be used 
to test whether the initiator gets the protocol message   earlier than the required time for 
the creation of the message. 
Query 5: Is such a state reachable where the initiator has finished the protocol 
execution but the message has been received in a shorter time than the required time for 
the correct protocol execution? 
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The query is not satisfied, hence it is not possible for the initiator to get the 
protocol message 4 earlier than the required time for the correct execution. 
5.6. Modeling Neuman-Stubblebine Subsequent Part 
Because of the fact that the intruder model increases the state space so 
enormously and it may cause state space explosion, the initial and subsequent 
authentication parts are analyzed individually. Up to now, the initial part of the protocol 
is modeled and verified. This section gives the model for the subsequent authentication 
part which involves only the initiator, responder and the intruder.  
In the subsequent part, the knowledge acquired in the initial part should be 
included in the model as if the principals already know them. In the initial part, the 
initiator learns the shared key    , the ticket               to be used in the subsequent 
part. Hence, this information should be added to the initiator’s knowledge base. 
Similarly, also the responder should know     to communicate with the initiator in case 
the ticket check is successful.  
In addition, the       and the     arrays should contain the values for the 
already encrypted blocks. Then, these arrays should contain the corresponding plaintext 
and the key for the ciphertext ticket to enable the responder to decrypt the ticket and 
check its correctness. In this second part, Init automaton is expanded with the 
initialization of these values as given in Figure 5.16. In the execution of the initial part, 
the block          corresponds to    ,       , and the encrypted block 
             resides in the index  . Hence, the  
   index of       and     arrays 
should keep the corresponding values in order to make it decryptable by the responder. 
 
 
Figure 5.16. The Init Automaton for the Subsequent Part 
 
 The model includes the initiator and the responder both involving in all three 
steps of the subsequent part of the protocol. 
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1.                            
2.                      
3.                  
 The automata for the subsequent part are constructed as the continuation of the 
initial part in order to make them easily combined. Figure 5.17 and Figure 5.18 give the 
initiator and the responder automata respectively. 
 
 
Figure 5.17. The Initiator Automata for the Subsequent Authentication Part 
 
 
Figure 5.18. The Responder Automata for the Subsequent Authentication Part 
 
 The global clock variable          is employed in the model to keep the time 
elapsed from the beginning of the protocol execution, and used for testing the key 
expiration time. The ticket expires when          is greater than the expiration time. 
When the responder gets the first message, it checks the validity of the ticket. If it is still 
valid and the message content is correct, it continues the protocol execution. Note that 
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the expiration time is checked by comparing the          with       instead of   , 
due to the design considerations, as explained in section 5.4.2.  
 The intruder model for the initial part is extended so that in addition to the 
protocol messages of this part, it can also read the messages of the subsequent part, 
decompose them, perform encryption/decryption and compose fake messages as given 
in Figure 5.19 (The dotted empty transition from state I1 to I3 is not employed in this 
subsequent model; but it is needed and used in the complete intruder model). 
 
 
 
Figure 5.19. The Intruder Automata for the Neuman-Stubblebine Protocol 
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5.7. Validation and Verification of the Subsequent Part 
 The following query is used to validate the model by checking whether the 
principals can both finish the execution of the subsequent part. The property is satisfied 
and the correct protocol execution is simulated. 
Query 6: Is such a state reachable where both the initiator and the responder finish the 
protocol execution? 
                                              
Similar to the Query 2, the following query is related to the correspondence 
property and checks whether there is a run such that the responder finishes protocol 
execution although the initiator has not. 
Query 7: Is such a state reachable where the responder has finished but the initiator 
has not finished the initial protocol execution? 
                                                 
 The property is not satisfied meaning that no such state is reachable. However, 
the protocol is exposed to a parallel session attack given in section 5.3 which may yield 
a protocol run not satisfying the correspondence property. 
In this model, one automaton for the initiator and one automaton for the 
responder are used allowing them to execute just one protocol run at a time. Hence, the 
model cannot detect the parallel session attack that occurs when two protocol runs are 
executed concurrently and messages from one run are used to form fake messages in 
another run.  
In this attack, the initiator sends the protocol message 1 to the responder and 
goes to state    . The responder takes the message, sends the initiator message 2 and 
goes to state     where it waits for the protocol message3. However, in the parallel 
session attack, the intruder reads these messages, composes a new message as message1 
of another protocol run and sends it to the responder which should be accepted in state 
   . Since the responder is currently in state    , it cannot accept this message1 of 
another run and the model cannot generate this flawed scenerio. 
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Query 8 checks the secrecy property for the subsequent part in a similar way as 
for Query 3. The query is satisfied meaning that in a correct protocol execution, the 
secret key shared by the responder and the initiator cannot be learned by the intruder. 
Query 8: The execution of the protocol run leads to the fact that, the secret key shared 
by the responder and the initiator cannot be learned by the intruder. 
                                                                   
                                                        
As for the analysis of the timing of the message arrivals, the next queries check 
whether a message arrives earlier than expected, similar to queries 4 and 5. 
Query 9: Is such a state reachable where the responder has finished the protocol 
execution but the protocol message 3 has been received in a shorter time than the 
required time for the correct execution of the protocol? 
                                                                        
                          
Query 10: Is such a state reachable where the initiator has finished the protocol 
execution but the protocol message 2 has been received in a shorter time than the 
required time for the correct execution of the protocol? 
                                                                        
                                                 
These queries are not satisfied meaning that the messages do not arrive earlier 
than expected. As it is seen, although it may be possible to have premature messages in 
case of the parallel session attack, our model is unable to detect them since it cannot 
model the concurrent execution of more than one protocol executions. 
5.8. Combining the Initial and Subsequent Parts  
This section gives the complete automata for the initiator and the responder that 
model the execution of both initial and subsequent authentication parts. The intruder 
model for the complete protocol execution is same with the one given in Figure 5.19 
with the additional empty transition from state    to   . Figure 5.20 and Figure 5.21 
give the complete protocol model for the initiator and the responder. 
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Figure 5.20. The Initiator Automata for the Neuman-Stubblebine Protocol 
 
 
Figure 5.21. The Responder Automata for the Neuman-Stubblebine Protocol 
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In this complete model, the automata designed for initial and subsequent 
authentication are merged by involving the key expiration time   . The global clock 
         is used to test the key expiration time, which is reset by the Init automaton so 
that          keeps the time elapsed from the beginning of the protocol execution. The 
execution expires when               , as given in Figure 5.21.  
If the ticket expires, then the responder does not accept the protocol message 1 
of the subsequent part and goes to the initial authentication to get a new session key. 
The initiator has two transitions after the execution of the initial part which may 
continue with the subsequent part or go back to the initial part to get a new session key 
and a ticket, depending on the responder’s behavior. 
The protocol execution can be executed more than once by using the Init 
automata emitting        signal in a loop and reseting the clock         . So, it is 
possible to simulate the model continuing by the second iteration of the protocol, 
starting from the initial authentication part. Our limitation here to simulate it once is 
related to the limitation of the size of encryption/decryption arrays and the nonce values 
can be generated (see section 6.2.2), which are restricted to have smaller state space and 
to be able to verify our queries. 
Table 5.2 lists the summary of the verification results for the queries including 
the number of states stored, number of states explored, the user and the system time for 
the queries performed in our case study (using random seed values). 
 
Table 5.2. Verification Results for the Queries 
Query Model Seed 
States 
stored 
States 
explored 
Real time Satisfied 
1 Initial 1279609757 444648 651457 0m9.859s Yes 
2 Initial 1279609786 444648 651457 0m11.549s Yes 
3 Initial 1279609964 9045526 13472396 2m51.765s Yes 
4 Initial 1279610160 444648 651457 0m11.670s Yes 
5  Initial (*) 1279610225 1828010 2978888 0m31.286s No 
6 Subs. 1279610723 15472 24182 0m0.360s Yes 
7 Subs. 1279610746 12396981 20603774 4m1.857s No 
8 Subs. 1279611000 16404642 24710183 5m29.892s Yes 
9 Subs. 1279611343 12396981 20603774 4m2.420s No 
10 Subs. 1279611634 12396981 20603774 4m3.139s No 
1,2,3,4, 
5,6,7, 
8,9,10 
Complete out of memory 
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The system marked with (*) contains the part of timed automata for the initiator 
timeout given in Figure 5.7, instead of the responder timeout part, since the query 
checks the timing for the initiator. Query 10 also checks the timing for the initiator on 
the subsequent model which does not have a state space explosion problem and includes 
the timing for both principals. 
As it is seen from the table, the verifier goes out of memory in all queries during 
the verification of the complete model. This is caused by the state space explosion 
problem which is explained in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
ANALYSIS OF THE CASE STUDY: TIMED AUTOMATA 
AS A VERIFICATION TOOL FOR SECURITY 
PROTOCOLS 
 
6.1. Benefits of the Model 
Timed automata formalism provides an easily understandable model for the 
verification of concurrent systems. The state transitions give good insight about the real 
system so that the analysis can be performed in an easier way. Our protocol model 
mimics the protocol execution and allows studying on some example scenarios and 
counter examples by simulating and analyzing the model visually. 
Timed automata modeling is suitable for the systems that can be viewed as a 
parallel composition of processes. To model a security protocol, each principal can be 
modeled as an automaton which represents the behavior of the principal who involves in 
protocol steps by sending and receiving messages, generating nonces, performing 
encryption and decryption, reading and checking message contents. The communication 
between the principals can also be easily represented by using the synchronization 
channels between automata. The emitting and receiving signals with a global message 
variable successfully model the message transfer. 
C-like data structures and functions supported by UPPAAL are very useful for 
modeling cryptology. They provide the cryptographic operations to be held in the local 
functions of each principal which is close to the real world. In addition, these variables 
allow us to model the knowledge bases of the principals so that they know their ids, 
newly generated nonces, message contents…etc. 
 One of the most important advantages of timed automata is its ability to model 
time-sensitive systems. Since the correct functioning of the security protocols depend 
on some timing relationships between the events, timing information is important in 
their analysis. In our model, the network delays are considered to be negligible and the 
timing information for the time consuming operations such as nonce generation, 
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message encryption and decryption, the timeout intervals for the messages, and the 
expiration time of the session key, are included.  
Automatic verification of the model is another advantage since it needs less or 
no human intervention. Once the required properties are specified, the verification is 
performed automatically by the model checking tools. 
6.2. Challenges of the Model 
6.2.1. State Space Explosion Problem 
The most challenging problem of automatic verification and model checking is 
the usage of large amount of time and memory. Because of the fact that model checking 
performs reachability analysis to verify properties by exploring all possible states, it has 
to keep the clock values and the control structure of the automata. This results in the 
usage of huge amount of memory and it is called the state space explosion problem. 
This problem occurs on the systems with many components having transitions in 
parallel, since the number of states in a transition system grows exponentially with the 
number of the components.  
In a large system such as the protocol in our case study, the verifier goes out of 
memory because of the state space explosion. It is a serious problem; because, the 
verification process cannot be completed whether an erroneous state that does not 
satisfy the specified property has not been found before explosion. Such a situation is 
illustrated in Figure 6.1. The exploration starts from the initial states and continues as 
the expanding circles. After the state space explosion, it goes out of memory and 
crashes. In that case, the erroneous states may not be detected.  
 
 
Figure 6.1. Reachability Analysis and State Space Explosion 
reachable 
states 
initial states 
erroneous states 
state space 
explosion 
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This problem is also a current focus in the literature and some methods are 
proposed to overcome this problem. These can be classified as the methods to (i) reduce 
the number of states to explore, (ii) reduce the memory requirements needed for storing 
explored states, (iii) use parallelism or distributed environment, or (iv) exploring only 
part of the state space (Pelánek 2009). Some of these methods are provided or proposed 
as a future work for UPPAAL tool, and can be examined using the documentations in 
(Amnell, et al. 2001, Behrmann, et al. 2002, 2006). This section focuses on the 
modifications on our model to overcome this situation. 
There are some studies in which some verification results cannot be obtained 
due to the fact that UPPAAL ran out of memory (Harrison, et al. 2007, Huber and 
Schoeberl 2009, Heidarian, et al. 2009). Also, in our study, state space explosion 
problem arises in some cases. For some queries, the verifier runs out of memory and 
crashes. It is not a solution to increase memory since UPPAAL is a 32-bit process 
which means that it cannot address more than 4GB of memory. Hence, some restrictions 
and limitations are applied in our model to reduce the state space: 
 Separate initial and the subsequent authentication parts: 
The state space explosion problem is the reason why the initial and the 
subsequent authentication parts are modeled and verified separately. Because, 
the number of states is much larger in the complete protocol model that also 
employs some more transitions to ensure the continuity of the protocol 
execution. Since the queries cannot be checked on this model, the verification is 
performed for each part individually. 
 Simple Modeling and Eliminating the Redundant States: 
The states that do not exhibit interesting behavior are eliminated and the 
unnecessary behaviors are not employed in the model since it may be very 
consumptive. In addition, all possible operations are performed in the updates of 
transitions to reduce the number of transitions and states. 
 Use of Committed States: 
The use of committed states restricts the nondeterminism in the model. This kind 
of states are used in our model to guide the state space exploration and avoid the 
unnecessary interleavings of independent transitions, which can be considered as 
a simple form of partial order reduction. These states are not stored in the passed 
list and the interleavings of any state with a committed location is not explored. 
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This reduces the state space so much that changing even one state from 
committed to a not committed state may result in explosion.  
 Limit the Number of Operations: 
The intruder model allows the attacker to perform unbounded number of 
encryption/decryption operations and composing new messages, resulting in a 
huge state space. To prevent the execution of unbounded number of these 
operations, the number of operations that the intruder can perform is limited by 
using the variable        in a way that the value is not so small to by-pass a 
possible attack. 
 Keep the number of clocks and variables as low as possible: 
A symbolic state of a timed automaton includes the location vector, clock zone 
and variable valuations. So, reducing the number of variables provides us 
considerable savings. In our model, it is tried to use constant variables whose 
values do not change during the execution (such as the principal ids, initial 
knowledge of shared keys, etc.) and bounded integer variables which can be 
represented using less number of bits (such as the nonces and index variables 
used for encryption and decryption) 
For example, defining           and           instead of defining 
different length variables as             ,          ,             , 
             and            , saves us a few transitions from state to 
which might have ended up in exponential growth in possible next transitions 
and states. As it is seen in Figure 6.2, the first automaton with more number of 
length variables has five transitions where the other one has only two transitions. 
 
 
Figure 6.2. Reduced Number of Transitions  
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 Adding Guards: 
Some more guards are especially employed in the intruder model to reduce the 
number of available interleavings and nondeterminism without lessening the 
power of intruder, which caused an exhausting modeling phase.  
For example the parts of intruder automata in Figure 5.11, Figure 5.12 and 
Figure 5.13 involve some guards that prevent to take unnecessary transitions (It 
is unnecessary to try to extract a message where the intruder cannot learn 
anything new or to use an uninitialized variable. Hence, it is pointless to have 
these transitions as available transitions and increase the state space). 
 Make use of the UPPAAL verifier options: 
The minimal constraint graphs and aggressive state optimization that decreases 
the number of stored states are used to reduce the memory consumption 
although it may increase time consumption which is less restrictive in our study. 
These reductions provides considerably time and memory savings. However, the 
problem still exists for the verification of the complete protocol execution involving 
both the initial and the subsequent parts. 
6.2.2. Collision of Variable Values 
In a model, if it is possible to find an attack, then it should also be a possible 
attack on the real world. However; some flaws, although which is not an attack in fact, 
can be found because of some weaknesses or deficiencies of the model. In earlier phases 
of our study, such a problem had occured which is caused by the possibility of having 
same values for different data types in the model. 
For example, the values of the principal ids, nonces, the index values 
representing encrypted blocks could coincide, resulting in the responder accepting 
wrong messages as they were correct since the values seem to be correct. An example 
situation is given in Figure 6.3. 
In this execution, the responder   accepts an incorrect message because of the 
fact that the values of the message components seem to be true. In this example, the 
identity variables have the values    ,    ; and the       is initially  . The agents 
increment the value of this nonce variable and they get     ,     . The index 
values for the       and     arrays start from  . In the first step of protocol execution, 
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  sends the message including its identity and nonce.   creates the protocol message2 
(encrypts the block         with     filling in the     index), to send it to the server. 
The intruder does not transmit it, and it also omits the third step. It encrypts  ’s identity 
with   (which is meaningless in a real execution); filling in the     index (      and 
    arrays become as in the figure). It sends a fake message including only  ’s identity. 
In real execution, this fake message is not accepted by  . However, in this deficient 
model, it may be identified as the correct protocol message 4.   reads the empty (zero) 
part of the message as                , and        =1, which are possible to be 
decrypted because of the collided values. 
 
Figure 6.3. A Deficient Run Caused by the Collisions on the Variable Values 
 
To prevent the problem, the integer values to be used for each type are 
predefined. By using the variables values given in Table 5.1, such number collisions do 
not occur. One disadvantage of this solution is the limitation on the numbers to be used 
since we use only   bits for the values of a component. This also limits the number of 
protocol executions since the nonce values to be generated and the number encryptions 
that can be performed are limited. One way to overcome this problem may be to 
increase the number of bits to represent these cryptology modeling variables which is in 
trade-off with state space explosion. 
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6.3. Possible Extensions  
6.3.1. Retransmissions  
The model can be further extended by modeling the retransmissions which 
involve resending of messages that may be damaged or lost. A message can be 
retransmitted if the response message does not arrive in a specific timeout interval.  
To model retransmissions, an extra transition can be added from the waiting 
state to the sending state as it is seen in Figure 6.4 and Figure 6.5.  
 
 
Figure 6.4. Extension for the Initiator Automaton for Retransmission 
 
 
Figure 6.5. Extension for the Responder Automaton for Retransmission 
 
The transitions from    to    and from    to    model retransmissions that 
make the principals resend the message. These transitions are allowed when the timeout 
is reached and the total number of allowed retransmissions is not exceeded. This model 
is closer to the real protocol execution; however, it increases the state space 
considerably. 
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6.3.2. Parallel Sessions 
The subsequent part of Neuman-Stubblebine authentication protocol is exposed 
to a parallel session attack given in section 5.3.  
The parallel session attack occurs when two protocol runs are executed 
concurrently and messages from one run are used to form fake messages in another run. 
However, our model is able to execute just one protocol run at a time. Consequently, 
our automata model which has one automaton for the initiator and one automaton for 
the responder, allowing them to execute just one protocol run at a time cannot detect the 
parallel session attack.  
One idea may be to extend the network of timed automata by using more than one 
instantiations of the principal automata templates in the system definition to model 
different runs of the protocol. This can be done in a way that the instantiations of a 
principal should share the same knowledge base in order to behave as a single principal 
involving in different protocol runs. Nevertheless, besides having a huge state space, 
this does not provide us a way to analyze unbounded number of parallel protocol runs. 
The model and the protocol analysis can be further extended so that it is possible to 
examine unbounded number of parallel sessions. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 In this thesis, the objective is to study the timed automata model which 
introduces quantitative time information into the real time system verification and 
utilize it for security protocols. After the analysis of the timed automata theory and its 
implementation, a case study is performed on a repeated authentication protocol, by 
directly modeling it with timed automata. The time needed for the cryptographic 
operations, message timeouts and key expiration time are also employed in the model.  
In summary, the following steps are performed for modeling the protocol: 
 Each principal is designed as an automaton whose transitions mimic the protocol 
execution, which together make up a network of timed automata. 
 The communication of the principals is provided using the shared variables and 
the synchronization channels between the automata. 
 Dolev-Yao intruder model is used which also models the network. It is 
concentrated on the modeling of the intruder in a way that it has all of the 
abilities of the Dolev-Yao model and does not have large numbers of variables 
and the state transitions.  
 The details of the cryptographic operations (nonce generation, encryption and 
decryption) are abstracted away. Cryptology modeling and message creations 
are employed in the updates of the transitions. 
 Some simplifications and limitations are applied on the model to avoid state 
space explosion. 
Then, the model is aimed to be verified to find out the possible attacks. 
 The properties to be checked are specified based on the goals of an 
authentication protocol 
 The properties are written in the query language of UPPAAL which performs 
automatic verification. 
 The execution of the diagnostic traces are examined using the visual simulator. 
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 It is concluded that the timed automata model for an authentication protocol can 
be used to examine the predefined goals of a protocol. Model checking of Neuman-
Stubblebine authentication protocol with timed automata is able to find the type flaw 
attack in the initial part of the protocol, by analyzing the correspondence property. In 
addition, this attack can also be detected by using the quantitative time information. 
However, the parallel session attack in the subsequent part, which occurs when 
two protocol runs are executed concurrently, cannot be detected since our model allows 
the principals to execute just one protocol run at a time. The model can be further 
improved by employing the parallel execution of more than one protocol runs so that it 
can detect the parallel session attacks. 
In addition, similar to the other model checking methods, timed automata model 
suffers from the state space explosion problem that occurs in large models. In our case 
study, although the state space is tried to be reduced by using the verifier options and 
some limitations are applied on the model, the complete protocol model including both 
the initial and subsequent authentication parts cannot be verified since the verifier goes 
out of memory. Hence, some work should be devoted to overcome the state space 
explosion problem. 
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